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EXECUTIVE SUMRARY 
Sola- Power Satellites k,e-.r.j a:trs?tr-< I 1 r1n= . drirr - attention arid interezt 
ht the present time, however, the estimated 
in recent years as a pssible l m g - t e r .  srJ17dtioT! tg the enerzi needs of the 
United States and the world. 
costs for research and developent prior to derloynent of the first unit 
present a formidable challerge to commercial implementation. 
Tne capital cost per kll9i;Ztt for the !JASA Reference Design (about $2500 
per kilowatt) is sufficiently high to rnalte this design mrginally competitive, 
at best, with nuclear power in the 1990's. Thus approaches to financing and 
mnaging an SPS program in which innovative designs collld be developed and 
fostered must be soilght out an2 given high cmsideration. 
prog-am reduce to the key questions of ownership and control. Ownership 
(that is, the sources of capital) may be governmental, corporate, or individual; 
control m y  be exercised by a govemnt agency, a government-sanctioned 
monopoly, or a competitive corporation. 
Tne problems of financing and rrwaging a large-scale, lengthy SPS 
Since the R&D phase and the commercial implementation phase of an SPS 
program are qualitatively very different with respect to length of time 
before return-on-investment, we have considered two general categories of 
SPS organizations: (1) organizations capable of carrying out a complete 
SPS program, from R&D through commercialization; ( 2 )  organizations capable 
of carrying out commercial implementation only. 
Six organizational models for carrying out the complete SPS program 
have been examined in some detail: 
1. Existing government agencies (DOE, NASA, etc.) 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
A new government agency, 'patterned after TVA. 
A taxpayer stock corporation, a new concept. 
A trust fund supported by energy taxes, patterned 
after the financing of the Interstate Highway System. 
A federal agency financed by bonds, patterned after 
the Federal National Mortgage Association. 
The staging company, a new concept, already in the early 
stages of implementation as a private venture. 
Four additional organizational forms have been considered for commercial 
implementation of SPS: 
7 .  
8. 
9. 
10. 
A govemnt-chartered monopoly, patterned after the 
Comunications Satellite Corporation. 
The consortium model, already widely used for large- 
scale projects. 
The corporate socialism model, patterned after such deve- 
lopements as the transcontinental railroad. 
The universal capitalism model, a concept partially imple- 
mented in the 1976 legislation creating bployee Stock 
Ownership Plans. 
A number of qualitative criteria for comparative assessment of these 
alternatives have been developed. 
liabilities of these alternatives is needed. 
tion of an SPS program w i l l  involve a combination of the above methods. 
Models 3,5,6, and 10, in particular, require much more study since we have 
little or no historical basis for evaluating these models. 
Further work to define the advantages and 
The most probable implementa- 
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I ,  I NTRODUCTI ON 
The concept of harvesting renewable solar energy in space 
for transmission to Earth for terrestrial use has attracted 
increasing interest and attention in recent years. A number of 
design alternatives have been considered, including transmission 
of energy by microwave beam, by laser beam, or by reflection of 
raw sunlight; geosynchronous equatorial orbit, sun-synchronous 
orbits, or highly elliptical polar orbits; actively stabilized 
configurations or gravity-gradient stabilized configurations; 
photovoltaic conversion, thermionic conversion, or thermal cycle 
conversion; construction from terrestrial materials in low Earth 
orbit, construction from terrestrial materials in geosynchronous 
orbit, or construction from non-terrestrial materials in high 
Earth orbits, using either the Moon or Earth-crossing asteroids 
as the primary material source; and countless others. 
Although these design variations imply large variations in 
Satellite Power System (SPS)  program costs, it nonetheless appears 
to be the case that the initial investment costs for an SPS program 
based on any of the options discussed may total several tens of 
billions of dollars prior to the return of commercially significant 
quantities of power. The SPS concepts may prove to be economically 
superior to such alternatives as massive coal exploitation or wide- 
spread deployment of nuclear fission power reactors, but financing 
and managing a single integrated program of this scale poses problems 
of a kind which have never before been faced by the utilitles 
industry. 
(Note that it is not the total cost of a thirty-year long 
program of construction which intimidates investors; rather it 
is the large costs before any power at all can be sold which pre- 
sents the problem.) 
The possible benefits of an SPS program, however, both 
domestically and internationally, justify detailed and imaginative 
investigation of the issues involved in financing and managing 
such a large-scale program. In this study, we have identified 
ten possible methods of financing an SPS program, ranging from 
pure government agency to pr’ivate corporations. Most of these 
methods appear to have viable roles to play, at least in some 
phase of an SPS program. 
We have briefly considered the cost estimates provided by 
J. Hamaker of NASA Marshal Space Flight Center for the SPS 
Reference Design ( 1). Originally, it had been our intention to 
perform a number of economic analyses of the flows of capital, 
interest, present value, discounted value, etc., for this program, 
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b u t  it soon became c l e a r  t h a t  s u c h  a n a l y s e s  would s e r v e  l i t t l e  
pu rpose  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  v a r i o u s  schemes c o n s i d e r e d ,  e x c e p t  
f o r  n o t i n g  two s a l i e n t  p o i n t s :  
(1) The SPS program n a t u r a l l y  c o n s i s t s  o f  two p h a s e s :  
a l e n g t h y  R & D  p h a s e  i n  which as much as $45 b i l l i o n  
m u s t  be expended t o  a s s u r e  t h e  economic and t e c h n i c a l  
v i a b i l i t y  and c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  SPS program; and 
a n  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  p h a s e ,  i n  which SPS's are  c o n s t r u c t e d  
f o r  u s e  by commercial  u t i l i t i e s  o r  o t h e r  l a r g e  ene rgy  
consumers .  
( 2 )  C a p i t a l  c o s t  per k i l o w a t t  o f  b u s b a r  c a p a c i t y  f o r  
t h e  R e f e r e n c e  Des ign  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  h i g h  (more t h a n  
$2500 p e r  k i l o w a t t )  t o  make t h e  R e f e r e n c e  Des ign  
m a r g i n a l l y  c o m p e t i t i v e , a t  b e s t ,  w i t h  n u c l e a r  power 
i n  t h e  lggOts, so  t h a t  a p p r o a c h e s  i n  which i n n o v a t i v e  
d e s i g n s  c o u l d  be deve loped  and  f o s t e r e d  s h o u l d  r e c e i v e  
h i g h  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  
ASSUMPT I ONS 
Our c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  p o s s i b l e  schemes f o r  f i n a n c i n g  and  
managing a n  SPS Srogram n e c e s s a r i l y  began w i t h  c e r t a i n  assump- 
t i o n s  about  economic and  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s .  These a s s u m p t i o n s  
were as f o l l o w s :  
1. Most of t h e  a c t u a l  work i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  SPS program 
w i l l  be car r ied  o u t  by p r e - e x i s t i n g  c o n t r a c t o r s  and  s u b c o n t r a c t o r s .  
During t h e  A p o l l o  program,  more t h a n  9 0 %  o f  t h e  f u n d i n g  p a s s e d  
through NASA t o  i n d u s t r i a l  and  academic c o n t r a c t o r s  who a c t u a l l y  
per formed most o f  t h e  R & D ,  p r o t o t y p e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and t e s t i n g ,  
and p r o d u c t i o n  o r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  hardware and  equipment  f o r  
ground f a c i l i t i e s  and f o r  s p a c e  m i s s i o n s .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  w e  assumed,  t h e  SPS o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i l l  n o t  e n t e r  
t h e  mining  and r e f i n i n g  b u s i n e s s  t o  p r o d u c e  aluminum and s t e e i ;  
i t  w i l l  no t  e n t e r  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  b u s i n e s s  t o  f a b r i c a t e  n u t s  
and b o l t s  and shee t  s t o c k ;  i t  w i l l  n o t  e n t e r  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
e n g i n e e r i n g  b u s i n e s s  t o  b u i l d  l a u n c h  f a c i l i t i e s  or t o  p r e p a r e  
r e c t e n n a  f o u n d a t i o n s .  While an  SPS o r g a n i z a t i o n  may p e r f o r m  some 
in-house  R&D, most o f  t h a t  a c t i v i t y  as w e l l  w i l l  be  c o n t r a c t e d  
o u t  t o  i n d u s t r y  and a c a d e m i a .  The p r i n c i p a l  f u n c t i o n s  of a n  
SPS o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  t h e n ,  w i l l  be  t o  p r o v i d e  o v e r a l l  t e c h n i c a l  
g u i d a n c e ,  program management and c o n t r o l ,  and  f i n a n c i n g  f o r  t h e  
p r o j e c t  as a whole a t  e a c h  s t a g e .  
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2 .  We assume t h a t  t h e  SPS program w i l l  b e  implemented o n l y  
if t h e  c a p i t a l  c o s t s  or t h e  l i f e c y c l e  c o s t s  o f  a power s a t e l l i t e  
are comparable  t o  ( o r  l o w e r  t h a n )  t h o s e  o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r p l a n t s  
or of  e l e c t r i c a l  g e n e r a t i n g  p l a n t s  b u r n i n g  f o s s i l  f u e l s  ( p a r t i -  
c u l a r l y  c o a l ) .  Should  t h e  SPS prove t o  b e  demons t r ab ly  c l e a n e r  
f rom t h e  v i ewpo in t  of e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  t h a n  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  
or s h o u l d  a n  SPS program p r o v i d e  s i g n i f i c a n t  improvements  i n  t h e  
U.S. b a l a n c e  of payments ( t h r o u g h  d e c r e a s e d  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  
p e t r o l e u m  i m p o r t s ) ,  a modest premium i n  c a p i t a l  c o s t s  or l i f e c y c l e  
c o s t s  would perhaps b e  a c c e p t a b l e .  
3. Assuming t h a t  c a p i t a l  c o s t s  and /o r  l i f e c y c l e  c o s t s  f o r  
power s a t e l l i t e s  a r e  c o m p e t i t i v e  w i t h  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o w e r p l a n t s ,  
w e  f u r t h e r  assume t h a t  u t i l i t y  companies would b e  c a p a b l e  o f  
f i n a n c i n g  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  power s a t e l l i t e s  i n  much t h e  same 
manner as a t  present - -by  bor rowing  funds  a g a i n s t  f u t u r e  r e v e n u e s  
from t h e  sa le  o f  e l e c t r i c  power.  
(Some energy  c r i t i c s  have  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  U . S .  economy 
w i l l  n o t  be  ab le  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  p r o j e c t e d  
f o r  e l e c t r i c a l  c a p a c i t y  g rowth  d u r i n g  t h e  n e x t  two o r  t h r e e  d e c a d e s .  
Whether or n o t  t h i s  i s  t r u e  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  h e r e - - i f  t h e  e l e c t r i c  
u t i l i t i e s  can  f i n a n c e  p o w e r p l a n t s  o f  any k i n d ,  t h e y  w i l l  be  able  
t o  f i n a n c e  power s a t e l l i t e s  as w e l l ,  p r o v i d e d  Assumption 2 h o l d s .  
If t h e  u t i l i t i e s  c a n n o t  a f f o r d  c o n v e n t i o n a l  p o w e r p l a n t s  d u r i n g  
t h i s  t i m e  p e r i o d ,  SPS w i l l  have  t o  become f a r  less  e x p e n s i v e  t h a n  
t h e  Refe rence  Des ign  i f  a n  SPS program i s  t o  e x i s t  a t  a l l . )  
4 .  Al though m a j o r  s h i f t s  i n  p u b l i c  a t t i t u d e s  a r e  t o  b e  
e x p e c t e d  o v e r  p e r i o d s  as l o n g  as t h e  f i f t y  years c o n t e m p l a t e d  
i n  t h i s  s t u d y ,  we have  assumed t h a t  t h e  "American s y s t e m "  w i l l  
c o n t i n u e  t o  be based p r i m a r i l y  on p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  w i t h  v a r y i n g  
d e g r e e s  of gove rnmen ta l  r e g u l a t i o n .  P u b l i c  s u s p i c i o n  of  v e r y  
la rge  c o r p o r a t i o n s  or of  v e r y  l a r g e  government a g e n c i e s ,  w e  have 
a l s o  assumed, w i l l  c o n t i n u e ,  pe rhaps  even  i n c r e a s i n g  i n  s t r e n g t h .  
It i s  t o  be  n o t e d ,  however ,  t h a t  s i z e  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  view i s  a 
r e l a t i v e  mat ter .  G e n e r a l  Moto r s ,  f o r  example,  i s  p r o b a b l y  p e r c e i v e d  
as " b i g g e r "  t h a n  Exxon, b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  l a r g e  share o f  t h e  a u t o m o b i l e  
marke t ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  s m a l l e r  s h a r e  Exxon has o f  t h e  p e t r o l e u m  
i n d u s t r y ,  a l t h o u g h  Exxon ' s  a n n u a l  sa les  exceed  t h o s e  of  G e n e r a l  
Moto r s .  Large s i z e  i s  a p p a r e n t l y  l e s s  s u s p i c i o u s  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  
o f  v i g o r o u s  c o m p e t i t i o n  (or, a t  l e a s t ,  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n ) .  
5. A l l  c o s t  and r e v e n u e  f i g u r e s  q u o t e d  i n  t h i s  w h i t e  paper  
are i n  c o n s t a n t  d o l l a r s  (1977-1978) ,  w i t h o u t  a l l o w a n c e  f o r  i n f l a t i o n .  
Thus i n t e r e s t  r a tes  and d i s c o u n t  r a t e s  s h o u l d  b e  a d j u s t e d  upward 
by t h e  r e a d e r ' s  es t imate  o f  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  
r a t e s  i n  c u r r e n t  d o l l a r s .  (Dur ing  most of  t h i s  c e n t u r y ,  mor tgage  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f o r  p r i v a t e  homes have approx ima ted  t h e  e x p e c t e d  
long- t e rm i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  p l u s  3 % . )  
6.  C o s t  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  t h e  R e f e r e n c e  Des ign  are based on 
approximate  r e l a t i o n s  deve loped  from compar ison  of t h e  more 
d e t a i l e d  B a s e l i n e  Des igns  of  N A S A ' S  Marshall Space  F l i g h t  C e n t e r  
and N A S A ' s  Johnson Space C e n t e r .  Nei ther  o f  t hese  d e s i g n s  i s  a 
ma tu re ,  f u l l y - o p t i m i z e d  s y s t e m .  Thus t h e  c o s t  estimates f o r  t h e  
Refe rence  SPS Des ign  were c o n s i d e r e d  exemplary  o n l y ,  and t o  t h e  
e x t e n t  a l lowed b y  t h e  l e v e l  of  e f f o r t  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h i s  s t u d y ,  
w e  c o n s i d e r e d  some of t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e d u c t i o n s  
i n  t hese  e s t i m a t e s .  (Should  c o s t s  p r o v e  t o  be  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  h i g h e r  
t h a n  t h e  Refe rence  Des ign ,  i t  seems most  u n l i k e l y  t o  u s ,  i n  view 
of Assumptions 2 and 3 above ,  t h a t  s u c h  a n  SPS program would 
e v e r  be implemented.  Thus o n l y  c o s t  r e d u c t i o n s  were of  i n t e r e s t  
he re . )  I n  c a s e s  where t h e  Refe rence  Des ign  s p e c i f i e d  a r a n g e  of  
c o s t s ,  we a r b i t r a r i l y  s e l e c t e d  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c o s t s  f rom t h e  
Marshall B a s e l i n e  Des ign  i f  more c o n c r e t e  v a l u e s  were needed  f o r  
p u r p o s e s  of a n a l y s i s .  
7 .  From t h e  documen ta t ion  a v a i l a b l e  t o  u s  on t h e  R e f e r e n c e  
Des ign ,  It was n o t  e n t i r e l y  c l e a r  what was and what was n o t  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  R & D  e f f o r t s .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  we have  assumed t h a t  
t h e  c o s t s  q u o t e d  are  f o r  a comple t e ly  s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  SPS program 
which d e v e l o p s  a l l  s p a c e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  sys t ems  and o r b i t a l  
f a c i l i t i e s  beyond t h e  Space S h u t t l e  s y s t e m  as we l l  as t h e  t echno-  
logy  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  power s a t e l l i t e  i t s e l f ,  w i t h  no c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
from o t h e r  s p a c e  programs ( s u c h  as advanced  l a r g e - a n t e n n a  communica- 
t i o n s  and n a v i g a t i o n  systems, f r e e - f l y i n g  S p a c e l a b ,  f r e e - f l y i n g  
S h u t t l e  power module ,  e t c . ) .  T h i s  a s s u m p t i o n ,  i t  s h o u l d  be  o b s e r v e d ,  
p l a c e s  a d d i t i o n a l  b u r d e n s  on t h e  v i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  SPS; s h o u l d  SPS 
p r o v e  v i a b l e  d e s p i t e  these  h a n d i c a p s ,  i t  w i l l  i n  t h e  r e a l  c o u r s e  
of e v e n t s  be  much more s u c c e s s f u l  when i n t e g r a t e d  w i t h  s u c h  o t h e r  
a c t i v i t i e s .  
8 .  T h e  R e f e r e n c e  Des ign  assumes t h a t  two power s a t e l l i t e s  
w i l l  be  completed each  y e a r ,  each h a v i n g  a c a p a c i t y  of 5 GW.  To 
s i m p l i f y  some o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a n a l y s i s ,  i t  has o c c a s s i o n a l l y  
been  conven ien t  t o  compute i n t e r e s t  payments ,  r e v e n u e s ,  and 
c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  i n  a n n u a l  i n c r e m e n t s .  Thus f o r  c o n v e n i e n c e  w e  
have f r e q u e n t l y  lumped two such  5 GW power s a t e l l i t e s  t o g e t h e r  
as a s i n g l e  10 GW s y s t e m  produced a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  one per  year ;  
t h e  e r r o r s  i n t r o d u c e d  by n o t  i n c l u d i n g  s i x  months o f  i n t e r e s t  
on t h e  c o s t s  o f  h a l f  of such  a 1 0  GW s y s t e m  a re  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  
f o r  o u r  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e s .  
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I I I SURVEY OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Due t o  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t ime and r e s o u r c e s  f o r  t h i s  s t u d y ,  
no a t t e m p t  was made t o  perform a comprehens ive  l i t e r a t u r e  s u r v e y .  
Due t o  t h e  p r e v i o u s  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  s t u d y  team members i n  an 
18-month s t u d y  f o r  NASA Marshall Space  F l i g h t  C e n t e r  on Space 
I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  (1980 t o  2 0 1 0 )  ( R e f .  21, w e  have  a b a s i c  
f a m i l i a r i t y  w i t h  t h e  SPS l i t e r a t u r e .  On t h i s  bas i s ,  we c a n  s t a t e  
w i t h  some c o n f i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  bulk  of  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on t h e  
f i n a n c i n g  and management of a S a t e l l i t e  Power S y s t e m  program 
t e n d s  t o  be v e r y  g e n e r a l  and q u a l i t a t i v e ,  o u t l i n i n g  g e n e r a l  
i s s u e s  which must  be addressed by any s p e c i f i c  scheme. A s u b s t a n -  
t i a l  body of  l i t e r a t u r e  a d d r e s s e s  such  economic q u e s t i o n s  as 
c o s t / b e n e f i t  r a t i o s  and d i s c o u n t e d  program c o s t s ,  b u t  these  
have l i t t l e  d i r e c t  b e a r i n g  on t h e  problem a t  hand.  
Three  s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a l s  have been  advanced ,  however ,  
o u t l i n i n g  p o s s i b l e  methods f o r  f i n a n c i n g  and managing a n  SPS 
o r  an  SPS/space c o l o n i z a t i o n  program, and these  are examined 
here .  The c o n c e p t  o f  u s i n g  e x i s t i n g  a g e n c i e s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  NASA 
and D O E )  have a l s o  been  s u g g e s t e d ,  b u t  w i t h  l i t t l e  s e r i o u s  
advocacy .  A number of o t h e r  h i s t o r i c a l  p r e c e d e n t s  have o c c a s i o n -  
a l l y  been  s u g g e s t e d  i n  g e n e r a l  terms as p o s s i b l e  models f o r  an  
SPS program,  ar,d t h e s e  have a l s o  been  c o n s i d e r e d  h e r e .  Some of  
these  a l t e r n a t i v e s  would be  more l i k e l y  t o  s u c c e e d  under  c e r t a i n  
economic r e f o r m s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t a x  laws),  some of 
which have  been  advoca ted  f o r  r e a s o n s  e n t i r e l y  independen t  o f  
an SPS program. I n  these c a s e s ,  t h e  SPS program i t s e l f  may 
p r o v i d e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  i m p l e m e t a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  r e f o r m s .  
Some of  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  i s s u e s  
any s p e c i f i c  SPS program must f a c e  i s  i m p l i c i t l y  i d e o l o g i c a l ,  
a r g u i n g  t h a t  s u c h  a l a r g e  and economica l ly  v i t a l  p r o j e c t  a s  a 
l a r g e - s c a l e  e n e r g y  sys tem must (or must n o t )  be  e n t r u s t e d  t o  
government  r a the r  t h a n  t o  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  Our own b i a s  i s  
i n  f a v o r  of  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  a p p r o a c h e s  f o r  r e a s o n s  w e  w i l l  
d i s c u s s  be low.  
A number of more g e n e r a l  t r ea t i s e s  on management i n  g e n e r a l  
and on management o f  l a r g e - s c a l e  u n d e r t a k i n g s  have  a l s o  been  
c o n s i d e r e d  and t h e i r  c o n c l u s i o n s  and recommendat ions w i l l  be  
r ev iewed  below i n s o f a r  as t h e y  a p p e a r  t o  be s p e c i f i c a l l y  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a n  SPS program. 
The  c o s t s  of a n  SPS program and of an  i n d i v i d u a l  power 
s a t e l l i t e  are v i t a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  whether  or 
n o t  t o  p r o c e e d  w i t h  a n  SPS program. The l i t e r a t u r e  on a l t e r n a t e  
d e s i g n  o p t i o n s  i s  v a s t ;  t h e  b e s t  s t u d i e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  t h e  
MSFC and  JSC B a s e l i n e  Des igns  from which t h e  Refe rence  Des ign  
was d e r i v e d .  To t h e  bes t  of  ou r  knowledge,  no o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
have  been  examined i n  n e a r l y  a s  much d e t a i l .  Thus i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  
t o  know how f a r  t h e  c a p i t a l  c o s t  p e r  k i l o w a t t  of  i n s t a l l e d  capa-  
c i t y  m i g h t  b? r educed  below t h e  c o s t  of t h e  R e f e r e n c e  Des ign .  
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A s  a n  example o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  a l t e r n a t i v e  d e s i g n s  may 
have f o r  r e d u c t i o n  o f  c o s t s ,  i t  a p p e a r s  on t h e  bas i s  o f  t h e  
1977 N A S A  A m e s  Summer S tudy  on Space  Manufac tu r ing  from Non te r r -  
e s t r i a l  M a t e r i a l s  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  a 1 0  GW SPS c o u l d  be $3 .1  
b i l l i o n  ( e x c l u s i v e  o f  ground s t a t i o n  c o s t s )  v e r s u s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  
$18 b i l l i o n  f o r  t h e  Refe rence  D e s i g n .  The ground s t a t i o n  c o s t s  
q u o t e d  i n  t h e  Reference  Des ign  amount t o  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  $6.37 
b i l l i o n ;  presumably t h i s  c o s t  i s  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  whe the r  or n o t  
t h e  s p a c e  segment o f  t h e  s y s t e m  u s e s  t e r r e s t r i a l  or n o n - t e r r e s t r i E l  
m a t e r i a l s .  T h i s  e n t i r e  q u e s t i o n  o f  c o s t  p e r  u n i t ,  i n  o u r  o p i n i o n ,  
r e q u i r e s  a g r e a t  d e a l  more s t u d y ,  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  wide v a r i e t y  
of d e s i g n  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a v a i l a b l e  and  t h e  impact  of  t h e  c o s t  p e r  
u n i t  on f i n a n c i a l  s c e n a r i o s .  
The sheer s i z e  of s o l a r  power s . a t e l l i t e s  as p r e s e n t l y  
e n v i s i o n e d  ( 5  t o  1 0  GW e a c h )  p o s e s  s i g n i f i c a n t  problems f o r  
u t i l i t y  company sys tem i n t e g r a t i o n  and f i n a n c i n g .  I t  s h o u l d  be 
n o t e d ,  however,  t h a t  t h e  s i z i n g  o f  t h e s e  d e s i g n s  i s  b a s e d  on 
e a r l y  system o p t i m i z a t i o n s  which t raded  o f f  s e v e r a l  e n g i n e e r i n g  
f a c t o r s  w i t h o u t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  economic c o s t s  o f  i n t e g r a t i n g  
such  l a r g e  powerp lan t s  i n t o  ne tworks  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  much smaller  
u n i t s .  The o r i g i n a l  t rades  i n c l u d e d  t r a n s m i t t e r  a n t e n n a  s i z e  and 
mass, c o l l e c t o r  and c o n v e r t e r  s y s t e m  s i z e  and mass, s p a c e  t r a n s p o r t a -  
t i o n  c o s t s ,  and a v e r a g e  l a n d  c o s t s .  These  f a c t o r s  were c o n s t r a i n e d  
by t h e  a s sumpt ion  t h a t  t h e  microwave f l u x  d e n s i t y  t h r o u g h  t h e  
i o n o s p h e r e  would b e  l i m i t e d  b y  p lasma i n s t a b i l i t i e s  t o  2 3  mW/cm 
o r  l e s s .  Fur the rmore ,  i t  was assumed t h a t  o n l y  geosynchronous  
o r b i t  would b e  u s e d ,  w i t h  a t r a n s m i s s i o n  f r equency  i n  t h e  r a n g e  
o f  2 t o  5 Ghz. 
Many of t h e  c o s t s  assumed i n  t hese  t r a d e s  have changed d u r i n g  
t h e  l a s t  few y e a r s .  I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i g h e r  f l u x  
d e n s i t i e s  may be a c c e p t a b l e  i n  t h e  i o n o s p h e r e ;  new t e c h n o l o g i e s  
f o r  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of microwaves a t  f a r  h i g h e r  f r e q u e n c i e s  w i t h  
h i g h  e f f i c i e n c y  have been  d e v e l o p e d ,  a l l o w i n g  one t o  e n t e r t a i n  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of s i g n i f i c a n t  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  t r a n s m i t t e r  and 
r e c e i v e r  a r r a y  a r e a s ;  o t h e r  o r b i t s  have  become more a t t r a c t i v e  
( a t  l e a s t  p o l i t i c a l l y ) ;  and t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  for c o n s t r u c t i o n  
of  power s a t e l l i t e s  u s i n g  n o n t e r r e s t r i a l  m a t e r i a l s  h a v e  become 
f a r  more c r e d i b l e .  New t r a d e s  i n c l u d i n g  some of  t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
as w e l l  as upda ted  c o s t s  f o r  f a c t o r s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  
t rades  shou ld  be  done;  i f  t hese  t r a d e s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  1 o r  2 GW 
s i z e s  a r e  f e a s i b l e  (or even  o p t i m a l ) ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  v i a b i l i t y  of  
an SPS program would b e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  enhanced ,  e s p e c i a l l y  if 
f r o n t - e n d  c o s t s  f o r  the program s c a l e d  downward as w e l l .  
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111, ANALYSIS  AND EVALUATION 
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A N  SPS PROGRAM 
The magni tude  of t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  f i n a n c i n g  and managing 
a n  SPS program are  i n d i c a t e d  by t h e  c o s t  estimates f o r  t h e  
R e f e r e n c e  Des ign  as shown i n  Tab le  I as p r o v i d e d  b y  J .  Hamaker 
of  NASA Marshall Space F l i g h t  C e n t e r  (1). The R & D  phase  (which 
i n c l u d e s  v e r i f i c a t i o n  and d e s i g n ,  deve lopmen t ,  t e s t ,  and eva lu -  
a t i o n )  i s  l o n g  and e x p e n s i v e .  Procurement  o f  p a r t s ,  l aunch  i n t o  
space, and assembly i n  o r b i t  of e a c h  1 0  GW i n c r e m e n t  o f  c a p a c i t y ,  
on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  r e q u i r e  o n l y  f o u r  y e a r s ,  w i t h  
o r b i t a l  assembly  r e q u i r i n g  only  t h e  l a s t  yea r  of  t h a t  p e r i o d .  
The c a p i t a l  c o s t  of about  $2500 p e r  k i l o w a t t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  
comparable  t o  n u c l e a r  p o w e r p l a n t s  of  e q u i v a l e n t  c a p a c i t y  i n  t h e  
lggO1s. (The S u n d e s e r t  n u c l e a r  p o w e r p l a n t  proposed  f o r  S o u t h e r n  
C a l i f o r n i a  would have  c o s t  abou t  $1700 p e r  k i l o w a t t  as o f  t h e  
l a t e  1 9 7 0 ' s . )  
As p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  R e f e r e n c e  D e s i g n ,  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  
phase  i s  f a i r l y  slow i n  p a c e ,  b r i n g i n g  o n l y  1 0  G W  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  
c a p a c i t y  on  l i n e  each  y e a r .  The r a t e  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  however,  
c o u l d  be  t h r e e  or f o u r  t i m e s  h ighe r ,  b u t  t h e  s t a r t - u p  c o s t s  would 
be  somewhat h i g h e r  due t o  t h e  need f o r  a larger  f l e e t  of  l a u n c h  
and o r b i t a l  t r a n s p o r t  v e h i c l e s  and f o r  more e x t e n s i v e  o r b i t a l  
assembly  and l i v i n g  f a c i l i t i e s .  
The v e r y  s i z e  of  t h e  p r o j e c t  p o s e s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  f i n a n c i n g  
and managing t h e  program. I m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  a l a r g e  
a r r a y  of p e o p l e  and c o n t r a c t i n g  companies  a r i s e  a t  once .  F i n d i n g  
l a r g e  sums o f  i n v e s t m e n t  c a p i t a l  c o u l d  b e  a problem,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  
abnorma l ly  h igh  i n t e r e s t  c o s t s .  The r i s k s  t o  s o c i e t y  i n h e r e n t  i n  
s u c h  l a rge  c o n c e n t P a t i o n s  of p o w e r - - f i n a n c i a l ,  s o c i a l ,  and p o l i t i c a l  
--are n o t  t r i v i a l .  
I n  many r e s p e c t s ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  how t o  manage such  a 
program i s  secondary  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  how t o  f i n a n c e  i t .  The 
p r i n c i p a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  management be tween t h e  v a r i o u s  p o s s i b l e  
schemes w e  have c o n s i d e r e d  a p p e a r  t o  c o n c e r n  t h e  i n t e r ' f a c e s  t h e  
SPS o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i l l  have  t o  d e a l  w i t h  i n  t h e  implemen ta t ion  of 
t h e  program.  T h i s  problem,  however ,  i s  mere ly  a s u b s e t  of t h e  
l a r g e r  problem which e v e r y  l a r g e - s c a l e  p r o j e c t  must d e a l  w i t h  
if i t  i s  as l a r g e  and as l o n g  a s  t h e  SPS program i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e .  
That  l a r g e r  problem i s  t o  m a i n t a i n  c l o s e  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  t o t a l  
human envi ronment  i n  which t h e  p r o j e c t  must o p e r a t e .  Should an  
SPS program be gove rnmen ta l ly  funded ,  i t  may have t o  d e a l  w i t h  
c e r t a i n  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  
government  a g e n c i e s  i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  l i a b i l i t i e s  
of t h e  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  s y s t e m  and t h e  v i c i s s i t u d e s  o f  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  
and E x e c u t i v e  s u p p o r t  or o p p o s i t i o n .  
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TABLE I - A .  
R&D A N D  START-UP COSTS FOR SPS REFERENCE DESIGN 
( A l l  f igmes i n  b i l l ions  of 1978 dollars,  w i t h  no inf la t ion . )  
Year R&D Present Compounded Construction Compounded 
cost value value start-up value 
(1) (2)  cost (2) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17  * 18 
0.19257 
0 54635 
0.80605 
0.93002 
0.90601 
0.74872 
1.99202 
4.46445 
7.20571 
7.01965 
3.87294 
1.78839 
0.30756 
6.28576 
5.80182 
-- 
m m e  
0.18136 
0.48457 
0 - 67327 
0.73158 
0.52236 
1.30885 
2.76253 
3.66302 
3.95458 
3.82812 
2.82405 
0.77207 
0.12504 
0.67119 
1.77538 
-- 
24.27797 
0.19695 
0.57096 
0.87188 
1.05258 
1.09311 
0.99984 
2.33326 
5.00623 
7.17855 
8 - 56333 
8.90256 
8.20752 
6.74228 
5.02721 5.05000 5.16491 
3.82355 5.05000 5.48429 
3.74543 5.05000 5.82342 
3.97703 5.05000 G. 1E352 
68.29227 20.20000 L2.b5615 
* Year 18 is the f irst  full year of revenues from sale of e l e c t r i c  power 
(1) ?he "present value" is the  capi ta l  sum which would have t o  have been 
invested a t  the beginning of year 1, earning 6% real in t e re s t  continually 
compounded, t o  pay the expenses of t he  current year. 
(2) The "compounded value" i s  the sum of in te res t  on a l l  previous years' 
costs, interest  on the current year 's  costs assumed t o  be paid out 
quarterly, and the current year 's  costs themselves. ( A  real inteest, 
ra te  of 6% per year, compounded continually, has been assumed.) 
or from sa le  of completed power satellites. 
-8- , 
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TABLE I - B .  
CONSTRUCTION COSTS, OPERATIONS AND M A I N T E N A N C E  COSTS, 
AND REVENUES FOR 10  GW SPS C A P A C I T Y  
( A l l  figures i n  b i l l ions  of 1978 dollars ,  wi th  no inf la t ion.)  
Year Construc- Compounded Operations& Revenues N e t  revenues 
I t i on  costs  value Maintenance (3) 
~ 
(2 1 cost 
~ 
I 14 6.03405 
15 6.03405 
* 18 24.13620 
1 16 6.03405 
17 6.03405 
, 19 
20 
, 21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
6.17136 
6.57657 
7.41506 
6.98324 
m 0.32800 3.50400 3.17600 
0.32800 3.50400 3.17600 
0.32800 3.50400 3.17600 
(3) These revenues a re  computed on the bas is  of 10 GW of power sold at I 
$ 0.04 per kilowatt-hour wi th  100% load factor.  i 
(See Table I-A fo r  other notes.) 
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Table  I-A shows t h e  R & D  c a s h  f low ove r  t he  f i r s t  f i f t e e n  
years o f  t h e  SPS program. For e a c h  y e a r ,  t h e  R & D  c o s t s  t h e m s e l v e s  
a re  shown as well  as t h e  " p r e s e n t  v a l u e "  and t h e  "compounded 
va lue"  o f  t h a t  y e a r ' s  program. The I tp re sen t  v a l u e "  i s  computed 
i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  way: suppose  t h e  R & D  e x p e n d i t u r e s  of t h e  n - th  
year  were t o  be  p a i d  f o r  o u t  of a n  endowment fund  d e p o s i t e d  a t  
i n t e r e s t  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r .  How large a n  
endowment would b e  r e q u i r e d  if t h e  funds  e a r n e d  6% r e a l  i n t e r e s t  
a n n u a l l y  ( a f t e r  i n f l a t i o n )  compounded c o n t i n u a l l y ?  
The "compounded v a l u e "  i s  computed on t h e  c o n v e r s e  assumptior-  
t h a t  each  y e a r ' s  R & D  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a r e  p a i d  f o r  b y  bo r rowing  money, 
a g a i n  a t  6% t r u e  i n t e r e s t  p e r  y e a r ,  w i t h  i n t e r e s t  on t h e  p r e v i o u s l y  
accumula ted  d e b t  a c c r u i n g  e a c h  y e a r .  
The d i r e c t  c o s t s  f o r  t h e  R & D  program t o t a l  $42.87 b i l l i o n .  
T h i s  c o u l d  b e  p rov ided  b y  a n  i n i t i a l  endowment o f  $24 .28  b i l l i o n  
i n v e s t e d  as d e s c r i b e d  above .  If o b t a i n e d  b y  bo r rowing ,  t h e  t o t a l  
i n d e b t e d n e s s  o f  t h e  SPS program j u s t  b e f o r e  r e v e n u e s  b e g i n  from 
t h e  f i r s t  completed power s a t e l l i t e  would be some 468.29 b i l l i o n .  
The h igh  r a t i o  of  t h e  compounded c o s t s  t o  t h e  d i r e c t  c o s t s  i s  t h e  
i n e v i t a b l e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  p r o l o n g e d  n a t u r e  of t h e  R & D  p h a s e .  The 
h igh  i n t e r e s t  c o s t s  make t h e  R & D  phase  ve ry  d i f f i c u l t - - i f  n o t  
imposs ib l e - - fo r  p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r y  t o  f i n a n c e .  
The t o t a l  magni tude o f  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t h e  R & D  phase a l s o  
a p p e a r s  i n t i m i d a t i n g ,  p r i m a r i l y  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  a 
s i n g l e  v e n t u r e .  Even l a rge  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  p r o j e c t s  ( s u c h  as 
t h e  Alaska  p i p e l i n e - - t o t a l  c o s t  o f  a b o u t  $7 b i l l i o n )  a r e  f a r  smalLer, 
and c e r t a i n l y  much s h o r t e r  i n  d u r a t i o n ,  p e r m i t t i n g  r e c o v e r y  of 
i nves tmen t  w i t h i n  5 t o  8 y e a r s  ( t y p i c a l l y ) .  
We have assumed t h a t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  c o s t s  q u o t e d  
f o r  t h e  " F i r s t  Un i t "  and  t h e  c o s t s  q u o t e d  f o r  t h e  "Average U n i t "  
i n  t h e  SPS Refe rence  Des ign  are  e n t i r e l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  c o n s t r u c ; i o n  
s t a r t - u p  c o s t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  f a c t o r i e s  f o r  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e  of  SPS 
components,  p rocurement  o f  t h e  f l e e t  o f  l aunch  v e h i c l e s  and t h e  
f l e e t  o f  o r b i t a l  t r a n s p o r t  v e h i c l e s ,  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  l a u n c h  a n d  
r e c o v e r y  f a c i l i t i e s ,  and deployment  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  o r b i t  f o r  
worker  h a b i t a t s  and a s s e m b l y  equ ipmen t .  These s t a r t - u p  c o s t s  
t o t a l  $20.2 b i l l i o n  o v e r  a f o u r  y e a r  p e r i o d  j u s t  b e f o r e  r e v e n u e s  
from s a l e s  of power s a t e l l i t e s  o r  f rom s a l e s  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y  b e g i n  
t o  come i n .  The r a t i o  o f  t h e  compounded v a l u e  t o  t h e  d i r e c t  c o s t s  
f o r  t h e  s t a r t - u p  phase i s  low,  w i t h i n  a r a n g e  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  normal  
f i n a n c i n g  methods f o r  p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r y .  The magni tude  o f  t h e  
s t a r t - u p  c o s t s  may seem l a r g e ,  b u t  even  a i r l i n e  companies  ( f a r  
smaller i n  t o t a l  a s se t s  t h a n  t h e  u t i l i t y  companies)  have  p l a c e d  
o r d e r s  f o r  $ 2  b i l l i o n  o r  more f o r  new a i r c r a f t  w i t h i n  t h e  p a s t  
y e a r .  These c o s t s  a r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  b e  a m o r t i z e d  i n  l e s s  t h a n  t e n  
y e a r s  a f t e r  d e l i v e r y  o f  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  
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The c o n s t r u c t i o n  s t a r t - u p  c o s t s  cou ld  b e  a m o r t i z e d  ( i n c l u d i n g  
6% r e a l  i n t e r e s t  p e r  annum) by annua l  c h a r g e s  o f  $4 .06  b i l l i o n  
f o r  7 years ;  $3.08 b i l l i o n  f o r  t e n  y e a r s ;  or $1.98 b i l l i o n  f o r  
twenty  y e a r s ,  these  charges t o  be  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  c o s t s  o f  SPS 
c o n s t r u c t i o n .  I t  was u n c l e a r  t o  u s  whether  t h e  " t r a n s p o r t a t i o n "  
and "assembly" cos t s  q u o t e d  i n  t h e  R e f e r e n c e  Des ign  i n c l u d e d  
a m o r t i z a t i o n  of t h i s  equipment  o r  n o t ;  i f  n o t ,  t h e  c o s t  p e r  
u n i t  would be h i g h e r  d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  few y e a r s  u n t i l  t h e  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  equipment  and f l e e t  a r e  p a i d  o f f ,  w i t h  a s u b s e q u e n t  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  SPS c o s t .  
T a b l e  I-B i n d i c a t e s  t h e  cos t s  f o r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and  f o r  
o p e r a t i o n  and m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  a 1 0  G W  i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  power 
s a t e l l i t e s  as w e l l  as t h e  r e v e n u e s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  s a l e s  of 
e l e c t r i c i t y .  (These r e v e n u e s  assume 1 0 0 %  l o a d  f a c t o r  and 40 m i l l s  
p e r  k i l o w a t t - h o u r . )  Assuming 6 %  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  pe r  annum t o  be  
t h e  c o s t  o f  money t o  a u t i l i t y  company, a c q u i s i t i o n  of  a power 
s a t e l l i t e  c o s t i n g  $24.14 b i l l i o n  p e r  10 GW c o u l d  b e  p a i d  o f f  i n  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  10% years  o u t  o f  t h e  n e t  r e v e n u e s  i n d i c a t e d ,  $3.176 
b i l l i o n  p e r  y e a r  a f t e r  o p e r a t i o n s  ar,d ma in tenance  c o s t s .  Such a 
t i m e  s c a l e  i s  l o n g e r  t h a n  t y p i c a l  i n d u s t r i a l  i n v e s t m e n t s ,  b u t  i s  
n o t  u n r e a s o n a b l e  f o r  u t i l i t y  companies .  (Should  power s a t e l l i t e s  
i n  t h e  e a r l y  c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  phase have t o  assume t h e  bu rden  o f  
a m o r t i z i n g  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  equipment  a t  a fas t  p a c e ,  i . e . ,  $4.06 
b i l l i o n  p e r  y e a r  a d d i t i o n a l ,  t h e  payof f  p e r i o d  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  seven  
s e t  s o f  1 0  GW SPS i n s t a l l a t i o n s  would be  a b o u t  13% y e a r s . )  
( I f  t h e  R e f e r e n c e  Des ign  c o s t s  i n c l u d e  a m o r t i z a t i o n  of t h e  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  equipment  and f l e e t ,  t h e  payof f  p e r i o d  f o r  a u t i l i t y  
company b u y i n g  a power s a t e l l i t e  would be j u s t  7 years  i f  t h e  
c a p i t a l  c o s t s  c o u l d  b e  r e d u c e d  from $24.14 b i l l i o n  t o  $17 .73  
b i l l i o n ,  a p r i c e  j u s t  a f e w  p e r c e n t  h i g h e r  p e r  u n i t  o f  c ; l g a c i t y  
t h a n  t h e  abandoned S u n d e s e r t  n u c l e a r  p o w e r p l a n t . )  
From t h e  f o r e g o i n g  d i s c u s s i o n ,  i t  s h o u l d  now be c l e a r  what 
i s  un ique  a b o u t  t h e  SPS program from a f i n a n c i n g  p o i n t  of view: 
t h e  magn i tude  and d u r a t i o n  of t h e  R & D  phase are much g r e a t e r  t h a n  
a n y t h i n g  t h e  e n e r g y  i n d u s t r y  has h i t h e r t o  a t t empted .  F i n a n c i n g  
t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a power s a t e l l i t e  i s  f e a s i b l e  f o r  u t i l i t y  
companies  b y  c o n v e n t i o n a l  methods,  p r o v i d e d  c a p i t a l  and l i f e c y c l e  
c o s t s  p e r  k i l o w a t t  o f  g e n e r a t i n g  c a p a c i t y  a re  c o m p e t i t i v e  w i t h  
a l t e r n a t i v e s .  F i n a n c i n g  of t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  s t a r t - u p  c o s t s  i s  
l i k e w i s e  p o s s i b l e  by p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r i e s  w i l l i n g  t o  e n t e r  a new 
b u s i n e s s .  But t h e  R & D  e f f o r t  seems s i n g u l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t ;  no 
p r i v a t e  i n v e s t o r  would b e  w i l l i n g  t o  p u t  up money f o r  f i f t e e n  yea-s 
o r  more b e f o r e  c o l l e c t i n g  d i v i d e n d s .  The  b a s i c  i s s u e  i n  f i n a n c i n g  
a n  SPS program i s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of " f i l l i n g  up t h e  h o l e , "  p a y i n g  
o f f t h e  enormous n e g a t i v e  c a s h  f l o w  i n c u r r e d  by  t h e  R&D e f f o r t .  
Most of  t h e  e x i s t i n g  l i t e r a t u r e  on SPS assumes t h a t  o n l y  f e d e r a l  
f i n a n c i n g  o u t  of  g e n e r a l  t a x  r e v e n u e s  i s  c a p a b l e  o f  s u p p l y i n g  t h e  
n e c e s s a r y  f u n d s .  A s  w e  s h a l l  see ,  however ,  s e v e r a l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
c a n  be d e v i s e d ,  i n c l u d i n g  one p u r e l y  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  approach  
p r e s e n t l y  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g ~ s  o f  a c t u a l  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .  
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OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
The financing and the management of an enterprise represent, 
in effect, the two questions of o w n e r s h i p  and of c o n t r o l .  
Whoever provides the capital for an enterprise is d e  j u r e  
the owner; depending on a number of institutional and legal 
considerations, however, the owners of the enterprise may 
have control over the day-to-day business decisions of the 
enterprise which range from absolute (as in sole proprietor- 
ship) to virtually non-existent (as in the case of an individual 
who owns a single share of a large multinational corporation 
such as Exxon or General Motors). 
The ultimate source of capital for purposes of this dis- 
cussion can be taken to be the individual. Figure 1 shows a 
variety of paths by which capital can flow from a individual 
to such a large-scale undertaking as an SPS program. The 
paths marked 1 and 3 in the figure are subject to the individual'z 
control; the individual can allocate portions of his disposable 
income among various of these alternatives in accordance with 
his perception of the relative risks, returns, and desirabilities 
of these investment or savings opportunities. Only path 3 
represents a direct investment in the SPS program, presumably 
by way of the stock market. Paths 1 represent indirect invest- 
ments: the individual selects a decision-maker (such as the 
board of directors .of a corporation, the investment managers 
of mutual fund, or the directors of a bank or savings and loan 
institution) and entrusts his funds to their care. 
While the individual has a great deal of control over 
paths 1 and 3, he has very little control over path 4 since 
the government sets the tax rates. The taxpayer's control is 
solely through electing officials and by lobbying, both of 
which take effect very slowly. 
A potential SPS enterprise, then, must look to paths 2, 3, 
or 5 for its sources of capital. Individuals and corporations 
are relatively free to determine whether or not to invest in 
an SPS enterprise on the basis of their own investment needs 
and guidelines, which seldom include cost/benefit analysis. 
More frequently, these decisions are based on subjective 
perceptions of risk, effective yield of the investment, potential 
for appreciation of value, or glamor of the investment. The 
government, on the other hand, must base its decision to invest 
on political considerations, including public support f o r  a 
possible program, vociferous opposition for whatever reason, 
lobbying interests, regional tradeoffs, and economic analysis 
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including cost/benefit considerations. Yield on investment and 
potential for appreciation seldom enter into consideration, 
although analyses of these types are sometimes used to justify 
or rationalize decisions made for other reasons. 
Capital sources can thus be categorized into three basic 
channels: individual investments by the purchase of shares; 
corporate investments by insurance companies, mutual funds, 
banking institutions, or other business corporations; or 
government funding. 
taxes, however, day-to-day control of the decisions of an SPS 
organization are quite beyond his reach, unless he owns a very 
large block of shares in the SPS organization. Large stockholders 
have absolute, undisputed control of a block of shares and can 
thus exert significant influence over the management of a 
corporation. A coalition of shareholders holding an equal 
number of shares is in fact weaker than that of a single 
stockholder since the diversity of personal interests and 
desires among them make it more difficult to achieve and sus- 
tain the concensus necessary for them to act forcefully and in 
unison. 
Once the individual has made his investment or paid his 
The managers of an enterprise are subject to varying degrees 
of governmental control in their day-to-day decisions. Ultimately, 
the government has complete control of all enterprises in its 
jurisdiction since it defines the laws of the land, especially 
the tax laws, which can greatly affect the attractiveness of an 
investment. In practice, however, the government delegates 
varying amounts of control or freedom to different types of 
entities. It is convenient for these purposes to group possible 
SPS organizations into three basic types, in order of decreasing 
governmental control: Government agencies, government-sanctioned 
monopolies, and private, competitive corporations. 
In the international context, organizational forms become 
somewhat less clear and easy to define, particularly since no 
single world government has jurisdiction over international 
economic activities. Existing multinational firms operate 
branches or subsidiaries in each country under its local laws 
and regulations, with greatly multiplied legal problems. The 
present day legal context is described concisely by Professor 
-14- 
Richard Falk (3) as follows: 
The basic coordinates ofthe present world order system 
are contained in the Peace of Westphalia which brought 
the Thirty Years War to an end in 1648. 
Westphalia logic, the world order system is constituted 
exclusively by the governments of sovereign states. These 
governments have complete discretion to rule national space 
(or territory), and can also enter into voluntary arrange- 
ments (e.g., treaties) to regulate external relations and 
interconnections of various S G ~ ~ S .  But these governments 
are sovereign and equal by juridical fiat, rather than by 
virtue of some higher authority within the world order 
system. 
status than another by reasons of wealth or power or size. 
In such circumstances, "law and order" rests upon the 
volition of governments and upon their perception of 
c o m n  interests. 
According to 
No one government is entitled to greater formal 
Existing international enterprises of various sorts (other 
than multinational, private corporations) are based on treaty 
arrangements, bilateral or multinational accords and protocols, 
O r  subdivisions or subagencies of larger international entities 
such as the United Nations and the Organization f o r  Economic 
Cooperation and Development. During the present century, one 
other type of entity was granted international legal recognition, 
namely, the free city of Danzig, but its existence was terminated 
by World War 11. At least one proposal(4) has been made f o r  the 
establishment of a space colonization/Solar Power Satellite 
enterprise under similar status which could be granted by the 
United Nations but the endorsement of the idea by dozens of 
nations would be required. 
It thus appears that control of an internationally imple- 
mented SPS program would be most likely to involve either a 
government agency (such as the European Space Agency - 10 nations) 
or a government-sanctioned quasi-monopoly (such as INTELSAT - 102 
nations.* ) Several of these existing organizations which provide 
space-based telecommunications services are shown in Figure 2, 
indicating their positions in the matric of capital sources versus 
* INTELSAT is not, properly speaking, a monopoly, since the 
international agreements under which it was created cannot 
prevent other nations from forming their own analogous arrange- 
ments; this has in fact happened with the creation of INTER- 
SPGTNIK (9 nations), ASTO (20 nations), and NTSC ( 5  nations). 
Within each of these groups, however, the organization enjoys 
monopoly status. 
-15- 
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d e g r e e  of  gove rnmen ta l  c o n t r o l .  I N M A R S A T  i s  s t i l l  unde r  n e g o t i a -  
t i o n  p r i o r  t o  a c t u a l  fo r ina t ion ;  COMSAT and SBS are  domes t i c  U.S. 
c o r p o r a t i o n s  which  have  been g ran ted  monopoly s t a t u s  as r e g u l a t e d  
u t i l i t i e s .  ESA p r o v i d e s  communications w i t h i n  i t s  member n a t i o n s  
and t h u s  does  n o t  compete d i r e c t l y  w i t h  INTELSAT t o  which many 
ESA members a l s o  b e l o n g .  
MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 
From t h e  v i e w p o i n t  of management t h e o r y  and p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  
SPS program p o s e s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  011 two f r o n t s :  f i r s t ,  t h e  l e n g t h  
o f  t h e  program ( e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  R&D phase) ;  and second ,  t h e  s c a l e  
o f  t h e  u n d e r t a k i n g  i n  terms of a n n u a l  c a s h  f low and numbers of  
h i g h l y  t r a i n e d  p e r s o n n e l  working on a s i n g l e  p r o j e c t .  But t h e s e  
a re  matters o f  d e g r e e  r a t h e r  than o f  k i n d ,  i t  seems t o  u s ,  and 
a number o f  s u c c e s s f u l  examples can be s t u d i e d  i n  r e c e n t  h i s t o r y .  
These i n c l u d e  t h e  Apo l lo  program, t h e  Marshall P l a n ,  and day-to-dsy 
management o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a s  l a r g e  as G e n e r a l  Motors or Exxon. 
R e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e  s c a l e  o r  d u r a t i o n  o f  a p r o j e c t ,  per formancs  
o f  any task  s u f f i c i e n t l y  complex t o  r e q u i r e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  
more t h a n  a h a n d f u l  o f  peop le  i n v o l v e s  f o u r  key p r o c e s s e s  o f  
management : 
1. d e l e g a t i o n  of a u t h o r i t y ;  
2 .  d e l e g a t i o n  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ;  
3. c o n t r o l ;  and 
4 .  rewards and p e n a l t i e s .  
F o r  l a r g e - s c a l e  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  t a k i n g  more 
t h a n  a f e w  years  u n t i l  f r u i t f u l  c o m p l e t i o n ,  s e v e r a l  a d d i t i o n a l  
f a c t o r s  a p p e a r  t o  b e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  s u c c e s s ;  these  have been 
d i s c u s s e d  t h o r o u g h l y  i n  Reference  ( 5 )  by James E .  Webb: 
1. o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  f l e x i b i l i t y ;  
2 .  c l o s e  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  envi ronment  of  t h e  
3. e x c e p t i o n a l  p e r s o n n e l ;  
4 .  f o s t e r i n g  and u s i n g  i n n o v a t i v e  ideas ;  and 
5.  a v o i d a n c e  of  n a n a g e r i o - s c l e r o s i s .  
e n t e r p r i s e ;  
These  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  w i l l  a p p l y  t o  any o f  t h e  c a n d i d a t e  
SPS o r g a n i z a t i o n  forms d i s c u s s e d  be low.  Depending on t h e  d e t a i l z  
of t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  SPS program, however ,  some d i f f e r e n c e s  
may be  n e c e s s a r y  i n  t h e  ways i n  which t h e  SPS o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n t e r - f a c e  
w i t h  s u p p l i e r s ,  c u s t o m e r s ,  i n v e s t o r s ,  r e g u l a t o r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  cqd 
o t h e r  government  a g e n c i e s ,  b o t h  i n  t h e  U.S. and a b r o a d .  
A more e x t e n s i v e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  l i s t e c  
above i s  g i v e n  i n  Appendix I .  
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ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS FOR AN SPS PROGRAM 
Any proposed scheme f o r  a c t u a l  imp lemen ta t ion  o f  a n  SPS 
program m u s t  come t o  g r i p s  w i t h  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a s u b s t a n t i a l  
i nves tmen t  o f  money and t i m e  must b e  made i n  R & D  ( r e s e a r c h  and 
development:  t echno logy  and sys t em v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  and e n g i n e e r i n g  
d e s i g n ,  development ,  t e s t i n g ,  and e v a l u a t i o n )  b e f o r e  t h e  f i r s t  
commercial  power s a t e l l i t e  i s  b u i l t .  The NASA R e f e r e n c e  Des ign  
(.in t h e  Marsha l l  Space  F l i g h t  C e n t e r  v e r s i o n )  assumes a n i n e  
year v e r i f i c a t i o n  program and a n i n e  y e a r  DDT&E program, w i t h  a 
t h r e e  y e a r  o v e r l a p .  The R & D  program assumed h e r e  i n c l u d e s  t h e  
development of advanced t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  sys t ems  and  o f  o r b i t a l  
assembly  and h a b i t a t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s ,  as w e l l  as t h e  development  
of SPS t echno logy .  
A c t u a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  f i rs t  5 GW u n i t  would b e g i n  i n  t h e  
1 4 t h  y e a r ,  o v e r l a p p i n g  t h e  l a s t  two years  of t h e  DDT&E e f f o r t .  
The f i s r t  u n i t  would commence commercial  o p e r a t i o n  a t  t h e  end  of 
t h e  1 7 t h  y e a r .  The v e r i f i c a t i o n  program i s  est imated t o  c o s t  
$4.9 b i l l i o n  ( u n i n f l a t e d  1 9 7 8  d o l l a r s ) ;  t h e  p r e - c o n s t r u c t i o n  
DDT&E program, a n o t h e r  $35 .88  b i l l i o n ;  and  t h e  f i n a l  two years 
of DDT&E ( o v e r l a p p i n g  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  u n i t ) ,  a n o t h e r  
$ 2 . 0 9  b i l l i o n .  
While i t  may be p o s s i b l e  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  t i m e  s c a l e  f rom 1 3  
years b e f o r e  i n i t i a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  t o  p e r h a p s  8 or 1 0  y e a r s ,  and 
t o  r e d u c e  t h e  c o s t s  b y  a f a c t o r  o f  p e r h a p s  two, t h e  f r o n t - e n d  
burden  would s t i l l  be  a m a j o r  impediment t o  c o n v e n t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  
inves tmen t  a p p r o a c h e s .  A s  a g e n e r a l  r u l e  of thumb, i n d u s t r y  cannot  
i n v e s t  i n  c a p i t a l  equipment  which w i L l  n o t  p a y  f o r  i t s e l f  w i t h i n  
f i v e  t o  e i g h t  y e a r s ;  f o r  u t i l i t y  companies ,  a new g e n e r a t i n g  p l a n t  
can t a k e  up t o  t e n  or t w e l v e  y e a r s  t o  pay f o r  i t s e l f ,  b u t  t h e  
r e t u r n  on inves tmen t  f o r  t h e  b o n d h o l d e r s  and s t o c $ h o l d e r s  i s  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  lower  f o r  u t i l i t y  companies  t h a n  f o r  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
companies ,  f o r  example.  
been deve loped ,  however,  a c t u a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  c o u l d  be f i n a n c e d  
more or l e s s  c o n v e n t i o n a l l y ,  s i n c e  r e v e n u e s  would commence as 
l i t t l e  as f o u r  y e a r s  l a t e r ,  w i t h i n  t h e  t i m e  f rame f e a s i b l e  f o r  
p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  
Once t h e  t echno logy  f o r  deployment  o f  a commercial  SPS has  
For t h e s e  r e a s o n s ,  t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e s  be tween t h e  
R & D  phase  and t h e  commercial  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  p h a s e  a r e  enormous.  
O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  d e s i g n s  f o r  a n  SPS program must r e c o g n i z e  t h e s e  
d i f f e r e n c e s  and come t o  g r i p s  w i t h  them. F a i l u r e  t o  r e c o g n i z e  
t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  has lead many t o  assume ( o f t e n  t a c i t l y )  t h a t  on ly  
government ownership of t h e  SPS e n t e r p r i s e  i s  f e a s i b l e .  T h i s  need 
n o t  b e  t h e  c a s e ,  however,  if t h e  SPS program i s  o r g a n i z e d  d i f f e r -  
e n t l y  i n  t h e  two s u c c e s s i v e  p h a s e s .  
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Accoydingly, we have considered possible organizational 
(1) those forms for an SPS program ig two major categories: 
organizational forms which could undertake the entire SPS program, 
from verification through DDT&E into commercial implementation; 
and (2) those organizational forms which could undertake only the 
commercialization phase of the program, after technical and economic 
risks had been demonstrated to be acceptable by some other organize- 
tion. A total of ten organizational models were considered in this 
study; their positions in the ownership/control matrix are shown 
in Figures 3, 4-A, and 4-B. 
Possible organizational forms for carrying out the entire 
SPS program, from R&D through commercialization, are shown in 
Figure 3. These candidate forms are as follows: 
1. 
2 .  
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6 .  
Existing government agencies (DOE, NASA, etc.) 
New government agency, here designated the "Space 
Utilization Authority" as proposed by Philomena 
G. Grodzka ( 6 ) asan analog to the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. 
Taxpayer stock corporation, herein designated 
" U . S .  Powersat Service" due to some analogies to 
the U.S. Postal Service. This concept was first 
proposed by George E. Fredericks and Richard D. 
Stutzke ( 7 ) as a government chartered monopoly, 
although it could also be established as one of 
several competitive corporations. 
Trust fund supported by energy taxes, here design- 
ated as "Federal Spacepower Trust Fund," an analog 
to the Federal Highway Trust Fund which created the 
Interstate Highway System with funds derived from 
gasoline taxes paid by all highway users in the 
United States. 
Federal agency supported by floating long-term 
bonds backed by the Treasury, here designated 
"Federal National Space Projects Association" 
(nicknamed "Fannie Spray") , in close analogy to 
the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie 
Mae"). 
The staging company concept, already incorporated 
in Delaware as of August 3, 1978, under the name 
International Satellite Industries, Inc., by attorne2- 
Christian 0. Basler of New York who first proposed 
this concept. ( 8  ) 
Several combinations of ownership and control are marked "X" 
in Figure 3 to indicate that they are unlikely to be feasible 
combinations. Individual investment capital alone is almost 
certain to be insufficient to finance the entire duration of an 
SPS program, regardless of the degree of government control exer- 
cised over the project. Similarly, purely corporate investments 
in such a very long term project are virtually impossible except 
perhaps in very token amounts if they can be treated as phi1anthro:lc 
tax deductions. The schemes shown in this diagram will be des- 
cribed in greater detail below. 
-19- 
TT a e 
(3 
0 oz 
Q 
v) 
Q 
v) 
U 
0 
z 
0 
l- 
e 
3 a- c 
-It- = =  
LLc c e 
0 
LL 
U 
a 
-Ja 
-I 
z 
0 
I- 
N 
z 
(3 
E 
0 
W 
A 
v) 
cn 
0 a 
a 
U 
a 
a 
I 
a 
U 
- 
M 
W 
oz 
3 
(3 
LLl 
U 
W Z  
> O  
I-I- 
u u  
-a 
I 
Z W >  
W Z J  zoo z-a 
El-0 
W O Z  
> Z O  
a m  
+n 
oaz 
I 
I 
: I  
I 
I 
I 
L --- t 
0 
/ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I >  I 
l- 
w z  
x 
X 
x 
-20- 
have already 
haps 7 to 15 
are shown in 
If we now consider the commercial implementation phase 
only, assuming that government agencies such as DOE and N A S A  
provided the R&D necessary over a period of per- 
years, four possibilities arise. Funding and control 
Figures 4-A and 4-B for these four: 
7 .  
8 .  
9. 
10. 
A government-chartered monopoly, here designated 
"Solar Satellite Corporation" in analogy to the 
Communications Satellite Corporation, with owner- 
ship divided between the general public and the 
utilities industry, 
The consortium model, in which one or more con- 
sortia of aerospace companies, high technology 
companies, engineering companies, and management 
companies undertake to construct SPS's using the 
technology base developed by DOE, N A S A ,  and others 
during the R&D phases. 
The corporate socialism model, analogous to the 
method of financing the Union Pacific Railroad and 
the development of jet air transport more recently. 
The universal capitalism model, proposed by Louis 
0. Kelso as an economic reform permitting wider 
participation in the ownership o f  stocks, leading 
to a "Second Income" (dividends) f o r  most workers. 
( 9 ) (See Figure 4-B). 
Any of  the methods based on non-governmental agencies would 
be improved in their effectiveness and profitability by certain 
types of tax legislation, as discussed below. 
Before describing each of these approaches to financing 
and managing an SPS program, we will first discuss criteria f o r  
evaluation of these alternatives. Then the detailed descriptions 
of each alternative scheme can be combined with discussions of 
the merits and liabilities of each approach. 
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION 
A meaningful comparative evaluation of alternative financial 
and management approaches must be based on a common set of criteria 
applied across-the-board. Five general categories of criteria 
were considered in this preliminary assessment: economic, politicsl, 
military, societal, and technological. 
Economic criteria. The sine qua non for an organization 
proposing to undertake the SPS program is the intrinsic feasibility 
for that organization to obtain the level of funding needed. Because 
of  the taxing authority of the federal government and the size of 
the GNP, it is clear that any government-owned scheme which can 
. draw on the general tax funds of the federal government is--at 
least in principle--capable of acquiring the necessary capital, 
either by direct appropriations or b y  borrowing against future 
revenues. T h a t  private enterprises can obtain f'inancing f o r  
such large single projects as the commercialization of power 
-21- 
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satellites is somewhat less clear, although if the risks are 
perceived to be reasonable, even large sums of capital can be 
obtained privately. 
In view of the high front-end costs prior to deployment 
of the first commercial SPS, financing of the program must be 
organized so as to provide a near-optimum distribution of risks 
and rewards in order to give maximum assurance that required 
capital funding will be available when needed. In a program as 
large and as long as SPS, costs may escalate, requiring supplemental 
funding beyond the original projections. It should a l s o  be antici- 
pated that as the program progresses successfully, additional 
funding and venture capital will become available to the project 
as the risks decrease, and provision should be made for broadening 
the base of participation. 
Economic viability of such a large enterprise depends 
critically on efficient management. The management of the SPS 
program must provide for long-term stability and continuity of 
purpose, while maintaining flexibility to permit rapid responsive- 
ness to unforeseen changes in the economic, political, societal, 
and technological environments which are certain to occur during 
a multi-decade program. This requires that the SPS program 
management be structured from the very beginning to interface 
effectively with the multitude of governmental agencies involved 
with SPS. Efficient management will also require an organizational 
structure which permits unusual incentives and rewards so that the 
SPS program can attract and hold the most creative and aggressive 
management and technical talent available. 
The economic viability of an SPS program will be greatly 
enhanced if the available market for power satellites is inter- 
national in scope. An organizational structure which can permit 
foreign funding as well as domestic funding would spread the 
risks wider. Such support, however, is unlikely unle.ss the potentisl 
foreign customers could exercise significant control over either 
the power satellites from which they will obtain power or over 
the organization wh'ich owns the power satellites. The United 
States, for its part, would be reluctant to rely on an SPS which 
was not in its own control. These considerations suggest that, 
whatever SPS organizational form is implemented, it would be most 
viable if it sold SPS's outright rather than selling power. 
Financing of such purchases could be arranged in other countries 
by standard methods of capitalizing the electric utility industry 
or by loans from international sources such as the World Bank 
or commercial banks. 
The potential for an SPS program to make a rapid and signi- 
ficant contribution to U.S. energy needs has important economic 
ramifications which are difficult to estimate quantitatively. 
-24- 
These include improvements in the U.S. balance of payments, 
enhancement of employment opportunities by creation of a new 
industry, and acceleration of new technological developments 
which in the past has always stimulated new econoinic growth. 
Since an SPS program will necessarily involve a great deal 
of new technological development, the economic viability of the 
organization will be enhanced through vigorous marketing and 
licensing of patent rights for inventions not directly related 
to the SPS. 
The economic criteria described above may be summarized as 
follows: 
E-0.  
E-1. 
E-2. 
E-3. 
E-4.  
E-5.  
E-6.  
Ability of the organizational form to obtain 
the capital necessary for program implementation. 
Appropriate distribution of risks and benefits. 
Possibility for wide participation. 
Continuity, stability, and flexibility of 
management, including freedom to determine 
personnel policies. 
Possibility for foreign sales and participation. 
Impact on U.S. energy supply. 
Ability to capitalize on spin-off technologies. 
Political criteria. An enterprise as large as an SPS 
program would have to have broad support from the public, from 
Congress, and from the administration up through the President 
and his staff, whether or not significant government funding 
were involved. Such support, it would seem, could be obtained 
most readily by arranging the financing and management so as 
to offer opportunities for the widest possible participation 
and gain as rapidly as possible. If present trends in voter 
attitudes should continue, the structuring of the SPS project 
must avoid all appearance of becoming the back yard of big 
government. 
The nature and degree of international participation and 
of U.S. control over development and operation of the system will 
affect domestic acceptability of the program. Both government 
and private funding sources may be reluctant to commit risk 
capital to a venture amounting to a "give-away!! of U.S. tech- 
nological know-how to foreign investors. 
International acceptability, on the other hand, would seem 
to require the opportunity f o r  small developing nations to parti- 
cipate without total domination by the United States. Even among 
such small nations, the perception is growing rapidly that parti- 
cipation in space activities and their benefits will have profound 
impacts nn their destinies. This is reflected in the recent in- 
crease by nearly fifty percent in the membership of the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), 
-25- 
m o s t l y  small one-na t ion-one-vote  c o u n t r i e s .  
T h i r d  World c o u n t r i e s  a r e  f e a r f u l  t ha t  u n i l a t e r a l  deve lopment  
of a n  SPS s y s t e m  by t h e  U . S . ,  t h e  U.S.S.R., o r  a g r o u p  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  ( s u c h  as ESA) would amount t o  a t e c h -  
n o l o g i c a l - b e n e f i t s  g r a b  i n  which t h e  r i c h  g e t  r i c h e r ,  and t h e  
poor  g e t  p o o r e r .  
t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  r e p e r c u s s i o n s  would have a s t r o n g  e f f e c t  on 
s u p p o r t  of a n  SPS program, b o t h  i n  Congress  and i n  t h e  adminis -  
t r a t i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  S t a t e  Department .  
Some o f  t h e  small 
Whether o r  n o t  t h e s e  a t t i t u d e s  are wel l - founded,  
The p o l i t i c a l  c r i t e r i a ,  i n  b r i e f ,  a re  as f o l l o w s :  
P-1 .  Lack of  obv ious  dominat inr .  by  " b i g  government . "  
P-2.  P r o t e c t i o n  o f  U.S. t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a d v a n t a g e s .  
P-3. O p p o r t u n i t y  for T h i r d  World p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
M i l i t a r y  c r i t e r i a .  Both t h e  s p a c e  and ground segmen t s  of 
t h e  SPS s y s t e m  are  l a r g e ,  f r a i l  s t r u c t u r e s .  The s a t e l l i t e  por -  
t i o n  i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  s p a c e  weapon a t t a c k  w h i l e  t h e  
r e c t e n n a s  a r e  p o t e n t i a l l y  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  t e r r o r i s t  a c t i o n  (as 
i s  any o t h e r  c e n t r a l i z e d  p o w e r p l a n t ) .  While a n  a t t a c k  on a 
powerplan t  l o c a t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  of  a n a t i o n - s t a t e  would 
p r e s e n t l y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  an  a c t  o f  war, i t  i s  n o t  as c l e a r  t h a t  
t h e  same would a p p l y  t o  a n  o r b i t a l  p o w e r p l a n t .  T h i s  a m b i g u i t y  
may be a g g r a v a t e d  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  s a t e l l i t e  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
s y s t e m ,  b e i n g  a g e n e r a t o r  o f  l a r g e  amounts of e n e r g y ,  may i n v o l v e  
m i l i t a r y - r e l a t e d  t e c h n o l o g i e s  and may t h u s  be  p e r c e i v e d  as 
adaptab le  t o  m i l i t a r y  u s e .  To enhance d o m e s t i c  and i n t e r f i a t i o n a l  
a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  program, i t  would seem t h a t  f u n d i n g  s h o u l d  
come from s o u r c e s ,  arid b e  c o n t r o l l e d  t h r o u g h ,  c h a n n e l s  w i t h  as 
l i t t l e  m i l i t a r y  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  as p o s s i b l e .  
( A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  managament of t h e  program s h o u l d  be 
o r g a n i z e d  s o  a s  t o  p e r m i t  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  Depar tment  o f  
Defense and t h e  Department of S t a t e  t o  e n s u r e  (1) t h a t  n a t i o n a l  
s e c u r i t y  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  new t e c h n o l o g i e s  a r i s i n g  f rom t h e  program 
a r e  r e c o g n i z e d  and u t i l i z e d  i n  a t i m e l y  manner;  ( 2 )  t h a t  k e y  
t e c h n o l o g i e s  a r e  n o t  re leased  o r  e x p o r t e d  i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y  or 
i n a d v e r t e n t l y ;  ( 3 )  t h a t  t h e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  and d e f e n s i b i l i t y  of  
t h e  S a t e l l i t e  Power System a r e  t h o r o u g h l y  u n d e r s t o o d ;  and  ( 4 )  
t h a t  t h e  consequences  of sudden  loss of  some o r  a l l  power 
s a t e l l i t e s  a r e  t h o r o u g h l y  u n d e r s t o o d . )  
One p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e n s i t i v e  m i l i t a r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a f f e c t i n g  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  i s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  d e s t a b l i z i n g  i n f l u e n c e  
of an  SPS program on t h e  U.S./U.S.S.R. s t r a t e g i c  b a l a n c e .  A s  a 
beamed-energy d e v i c e ,  an SPS cou ld  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be  i n  t h e  
same c a t e g o r y  as  c h a r g e d - p a r t i c l e  beams and h igh -ene rgy  l a s e r s .  
Because of t h e  k i n d s  of  s t r a t e g i c  weapons c a p a b i l i t i e s  such  d e v i c e s  
have ,  they  may u p s e t  t h e  p r e s e n t  b a l a n c e  u n l e s s  t h e y  were  deployed  
s l r ~ l t ~ n e o u s l y  b both c u p e r p o i x e r s .  In any c a s e ,  t h e  f i n a n c i R g  
and  management of  a n  SPS program s h o u l d  be  a r r a n g e d  t o  p r o v i d e  
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adequate assurances and guarantees that nG SPS would (or could) 
be used in a destablizing way. 
Summarizing the military criteria, then, we have: 
M-1. Minimum identification with the military. 
M-2. Assurance against destablization of strategic 
balance. 
Societal criteria. The sheer magnitude of an SPS program 
and the consequent necessity for disciplined and efficient 
management of finances, R&D, and operations could lead to fears 
of creeping bureaucracy, elitism, and excessive concentration 
of power. An SPS organization should thus be structured to per- 
mit the widest possible participation of society, not only in 
the ownership (financing) of the enterprise, but alsc, in manage- 
ment and employment opportunities. The success of widespread 
participation in this way depends on the institution and imple- 
mentation of means for effective rewards and penalties for com- 
petence and incompetence, respectively, .at all levels of the 
organ i z a t i on. 
Excessive concentration of power within an SPS organization 
can be avoided in part by establishing the organization in a form 
which will simplify later divestiture of portions of the enter- 
prise or, indeed, total abandonment of the SPS project if changed 
circumstances make SPS no longer desirable. 
Candidate SPS organizations, of course, must be consistent 
with national and international principles. Outer space, like 
the oceans, is generally regarded as the province of all humanity. 
The ultimate legal matrix within which the SPS program must be 
formulated and operated is that of international law and the 
slowly growing body of space law. Clear guidelines are as yet 
scarce in this infant field; many of the elements of space law 
will follow rather than lead events. To remain within the develop- 
ing framework of space law, tne organizational principles for an 
SPS enterprise will have to observe general principles of reason 
and fairn?ss, relying on historical legal analogies wherever 
appropriate. In cases of significant ambiguity, an SPS organization 
should be able to make its own judgements and act upon them 
without unreasonable delay. 
The societal criteria, then, may be summarized as follows: 
S-1. Widespread participation in management and employment. 
S-2.  Flexibility with respect to later divestiture or pro- 
S-3. Ability to act decisively within the changing 
j ect abandonment. 
framework of international space law. 
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Technological criteria. During the lengthy period between 
initiation of a serious R&D effort and on-line operation of the 
first SPS, numerous technological innovations should be expected. 
Some of these will come from outside the SPS program; others will 
originate within the SPS program and have major impacts in other 
areas of society. A prime necessity in organizing and operating 
an SPS program is to provide the means for encouraging and identi- 
fying these innovations, funding their initial exploration, 
implementing their application within the SPS effort rapidly, 
and facilitating their transfer to other areas by vigorous marketinz 
of patent licenses. 
As growing numbers of power satellites are deployed over 
succeeding decades, initial designs and technologies will become 
increasingly obsolete. Adaptation of the program to new technolo- 
gies will become ever more important and advantageous. If the 
SPS program is successful, it will generate large quantities of 
new investment capital. Significant reinvestment of this new 
capital in the creation of newer technologies could become a 
historically very important technological "bootstrapping" mechan- 
ism. Both the energy and the new knowledge produced will diffuse 
globally, regardless of how the SPS program was initially formulated. 
In anticipation of this longer-range evolution, however, the initizl 
organizational form should be structured to permit and encourage 
this bootstrapping process. 
These technological criteria, in brief, are then: 
T-1. Ability to foster, utilize, and disseminate innovative 
T-2. Ability to stimulate continuing technological development. 
technology. 
The diverse criteria discussed above are, in most cases, 
rather subjective; they are of widely differing importance in 
evaluating candidate SPS organizational forms. At this time, 
these criteria are perhaps more useful as design principles for 
an SPS organization than as standards for selecting, once and 
for all, the single best form. Far more study of the candidate 
forms is necessary as yet before such a decision can be made. 
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D E T A I L E D  D E S C R I P T I O N S  AND P R E L I M I N A R Y  E V A L U A T I O N  OF A L T E R N A T I V E S  
1. Existing government agencies. In principal, an SPS 
program could be implemented by existing agencies including 
Department of Energy and NASA. The Reference Design cost esti- 
mates assume about $40 to $45 billion over the first fifteen 
years for verification and for DDT&E, with a peak expenditure 
of about $7 to $8 billion in one year. 
is somewhat below the peak expenditure levels during the Apollo 
program (with due allowance for inflation since then). The R&D 
phase of the program, it would seem, could be managed and financed 
in this manner, assuming sufficient political support for the 
program. 
Such a level of effort 
A significant potential benefit to using this approach 
during the R&D phase is the possibility of synei-gisms with other 
space programs, including large space construction, large solar 
power systems, and advanced orbital transfer propulsion capability 
required for advanced communications and navigation systems in the 
late 1g801s--ear~lggO's timeframe. ( 2  ) A liability of this 
approach is resistance from the space science community to the 
use of the Space Shuttle for space industrialization programs. 
channels, however, would be much more difficult. The Reference 
Design cost estimates suggest costs rising rapidly from about 
$12.9 billion during the first year to $29.2 billion in the fourth 
year, dropping to $24.5 billion in the fifth year, rising gradually 
over 30 years to a peak of $32.7 billion before tapering off to 
about $9.8 billion annually for maintenance and repair thereafter. 
Neglecting interest costs, the power satellites would have to be 
sold outright for more than $2500 per kilowat of busbar capacity 
if implementation were notto be a burdensome tax liability. 
Actual implementation of the SPS program through these 
Significant liabilities to such an approach include the 
civil service status of existing government agency employees; 
opposition to tax support of large, expensive, and unproven 
technologies; the placing of government agencies in direct com- 
petition with private industries providing comparable services 
( v i z . ,  construction of generating equipment for the utilities); 
charges of governmental usurpation of a major sector of the economy; 
uncertainty of long-term stability of management and purpose; 
inefficiency and inflexibility; slow responsiveness to external 
changes in society and technology; restriction of international 
participation due to direct involvement of the U,S. government; 
lack of participation by corporations and individuals domestically. 
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2 .  New government agency--"Space Utilization Authority. I' 
Grodzka ( 6 ) has  pointed out the parallels between the economic 
conditions prevailing during the 1970's to some of those in the .~ 
Depression during the 1930's. One of the most successful programs 
of the New Deal was the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
which deliberately set out to transform the eccnomy of perhaps the 
most depressed area of the nation at that time. 
those efforts, the region served by TVA has the highest proportion 
of jobs in manufacturing of any region in the nation. 
original program cost about a quarter of a billion dollars then. 
Grodzka argues that using tax dollars for the creation of new 
technologies and new industries of high leverage (as the space 
industry has proven itself to be) can stimulate the economy far 
more effectively than equal amounts spent in welfare programs, 
especially since an SPS program would create a large number of 
new jobs for unskilled and semi-skilled workers (particularly 
in the manufacture and assembly of rectenna components and in 
rectenna construction). 
As a result of 
The 
Placing an SPS program within a newly formed agency would 
certainly solve many of the internal political problems such a 
program would face within existing agencies. 
could be tailored to the long-term goals of the proj,ect far more 
effectively than would be possible within NASA or DOE where the 
wide range of goals and research foci would dilute managerial 
attention to SPS. But most of the liabilities listed above for 
existing agencies would still remain. 
authority and of funding required for the creation and operation 
of SUA. 'The diffuse and indirect nature of the benefits to the 
taxpayers is a major obstacle for SUA as well as for DOE/NASA as 
a potential SPS organization. 
Depending on the degree of independence afforded SUA by 
its charter, it could behave either like a government agency 
or like a government-sanctioned monopoly. Its lack of direct 
accountability to the public, however, is a major difficulty; 
TVA has itself experienced some difficulties in recent years 
because of local opposition to specific dam projects and nuclear 
powerplant construction projects, in which the residents of the 
affected areas felt their viewpoints were not sufficiently con- 
sidered. 
Management practices 
Figure 5 shows the flow of 
Over the decades, the increasing size of SUA would pose 
significant problems of concentration of power. For SUA to break 
up into several smaller units, each of them remaining a government 
agency, would provide little improvement. Should SUA wish to sell 
off a division to one or more private corporations, it would be 
difficult to ascertain the correct valuatiori. Alternatively, if 
an entire division were to be transferred to the private sector 
by issuing shares and selling the divisior, off t h r c u g h  the 
stock market, a tremendous liquidity problem would ensue, since 
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t h e  t o t a l  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  o f  SUA c o u l d  e v e n t u a l l y  exceed  t h a t  of  
t h e  l a r g e s t  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o e a y .  I t  wou ld  b e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  imagine  
t h e  government open ing  up t h e  SPS m a r k e t  a t  t h a t  t ime  t o  c o m p e t i t i o n  
from new p r > i v a t e  companies b e c a u s e  of  t h e  government Is v e s t e d  
i n t e r e s t  i n  SUA. 
3.  The t a x p a y e r  s t o c k  co rpora t ion - - "U.S .  Powersa t  S e r v i c e . "  
F r e d e r i c k s  and S t u t z k e  i n i t i a l l y  p roposed  t h i s  concep t  ( 7 ) .  
The f l o w s  of f u n d i n g  and a u t h o r i t y  a r e  shown i n  F i g u r e  6 .  One 
fundamen ta l  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  two  schemes d i s c u s s e d  above i s  t h e  
c o e r c i v e  n a t u r e  o f  f u n d i n g  a c o n t r o v e r s i a l  p r o j e c t  by  g e n e r a l  
t a x a t i o n :  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  i n v e s t  t e n s  o f  b i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  
would have  been made by t h  E x e c u t i v e  and t h e  Congres s .  I n  o r d e r  
t o  p e r m i t  a more d i r e c t  v o i c e  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  an  SPS o r g a n i z a -  
t i c n  s u p p o r t e d  b y  p u b l i c  t a x a t i o n  and t o  r e d u c e  t h e  s t i n g  of  b e i n g  
f o r c e d  t o  f i n a n c i a l l y  s u p p o r t  a p r o j e c t  t o  which many t a x p a y e r s  may 
be  opposed ,  F r e d e r i c k s  and S t u t z k e  p roposed  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of a 
t a x p a y e r  s t o c k  c o r p o r a t i o n .  
The b a s i c  i d e a  i s  t o  c r e a t e  a q u a s i - p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n  b y  
a c t  o f  Congress t o  implement  t h e  SPS program. Fund ing  would b e  
p r o v i d e d  by a s p e c i f i c  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  e a c h  y e a r ,  b u t  e v e r y  t a x p a y e r  
would r e c e i v e  some number o f  shares  o f  s t o c k  i n  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  
each  y e a r  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  f r a c t i o n  o f  h i s  or h e r  t a x e s  which 
had been  a p p r o p r i a t e d  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  i n  t h a t  y e a r .  Taxes 
d i r e c t e d  i n t o  t h e  program e a r l y  i n  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t  would,  
i n  e f f e c t ,  pu rchase  more shares  p e r  d o l l a r  t h a n  would t a x  d o l l a r s  
a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  p r o j e c t  n e a r  f r u i t i o n  on t h e  bas i s  o f  a f o r m u l a  
p r i c e  f o r  t h e  s t o c k  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  Such a f o r m u l a  p r i c e  cou ld  
b e  computed on t h e  bas i s  o f  t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  v a l u e  o f  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  
f u t u r e  e a r n i n g s  p e r  share .  
S i n c e  shares i n  t h e  U.S.  Powersa t  S e r v i c e  c o u l d  b e  f r e e l y  
t r a d e d  on t h e  s t o c k  m a r k e t ,  t a x p a y e r s  opposed t o  t h e  p r o j e c t  cou ld  
"redeem" a t  l e a s t  some f r a c t i o n  o f  t h e i r  t a x e s  s p e n t  on t h e  
p r o j e c t  by  s e l l i n g  t h e  shares i s s u e d  t o  them by the  T r e a s u r y  a f t e r  
f i l i n g  o f  t h e i r  income t a x  r e t u r n s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  p e n s i o n e r s  whose 
i n v e s t m e n t  t i m e  s c a l e s  were t o o  s h o r t  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
e a r n i n g s  from t h e i r  shares  c o u l d  o b t a i n  s h o r t - t e r m  b e n e f i t s  from 
c u r r e n t  t a x e s .  For t h o s e  t a x p a y e r s  who s u p p o r t  t h e  SPS program 
would have  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p u r c h a s e  more shares i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  
of  l a t e r  r ewards .  
While USPS would b e  s u b j e c t  t o  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r o l  b y  Congress  
d u r i n g  t h e  R & D  and e a r l y  c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  p h a s e s ,  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
would e l e c t  t h e  Board o f  D i r e c t o r s  f r o m  a v e r y  e a r l y  s tage .  A s  cthe 
s y s t e m  matures d u r i n g  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  p h a s e ,  and no f u r t h k r  
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  from Congress  a r e  n e c e s s a r y ,  t h e  D i r e c t o r s  would 
be answerab le  on ly  t o  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  j u s t  as i n  c o n v e n t i o n a l  
p r i v a t e  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  c r e a t i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  p r e s s u r e s  on the  
management o f  t h e  SPS program t o  m a i n t a i n  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and  
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .  A f u r t h e r  a d v a n t a g e  would be  f o r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  from t h e  v e r y  s t a r t ,  as w e l l  as t h e  d i f f u s i o n  o f  
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c a p i t a l  owner sh ip  among t h e  g e n e r a l  p o p u l a t i o n ,  which would 
have  b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t s  t h r o u g h o u t  s o c i e t y  and  t h e  economy. 
(See  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  c a p i t a l i s m  model f u r t h e r  
below f o r  d e t a i l s . )  
Whether or n o t  t h e  t a x p a y e r  s t o c k  c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  a d o p t e d  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r  t h e  SPS program,  i t  i s  a new s o c i a l  i n v e n t i o n  
o f  some merit i n  i t s  own r i g h t  which c o u l d  be c o n s i d e r e d  f o r  
o t h e r  long- te rm p r o j e c t s  as w e l l  which a re  e x p e c t e d  t o  p r o v i d e  
long-term economic b e n e f i t s .  ( C a n d i d a t e s  might  i n c l u d e  large- 
s c a l e  h y d r a u l i c  p r o j e c t s ,  Ocean Thermal E l e c t r i c  Conver s ion  
power sys tems,  or smaller  s c a l e  s p a c e  i n d u s t i a l i z a t i o n  o p t i o n s . )  
Because o f  t h e  n o v e l t y  o f  t h i s  i d e a ,  i t  i s  somewhat d i f f i c u l t  
t o  e v a l u a t e  how s u c c e s s f u l  i t  would b e  i n  terms o f  t h e  c r i t e r i a  
d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n .  If p u b l i c  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  
s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  program were low,  t h e  a c t u a l  s t o c k  market 
v a l u e  of the. shares i s s u e d  would be  ve ry  low; t h e  o n l y  c u r r e n t  
b e n e f i t  t o  t a x p a y e r s  who d i d  n o t  w i s h  t o  keep  t h e i r  sha res  would 
be  t o  c l a i m  a c a p i t a l  loss upon s e l l i n g  o f f  t h e i r  sha res ,  s e r i o u s l y  
hampering t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t .  
4 .  T r u s t  fund  s u p p o r t e d  by  ene rgy  t a x e s - - " F e d e r a l  
SDaceDower T r u s t  Fund."  Duriniz t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  d e c a d e s ,  t h e  
f ' edera l  government has p r o v i d e d  most o f  t h e  f u n d i n g  n e c e s s a r y  
f o r a  domestic p r o j e c t  comparable  i n  magni tude  t o  a n  SPS program,  
v i z . ,  t h e  I n t e r s t a t e  Highway System. T h i s  was m o t i v a t e d  by 
t h e  desire o f  Congress  t o  improve  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  and v e r s a t i 1 i t . y  
of t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ;  by  t h e  m i l i t a r y  f o r  
p o s s i b l e  u s e  i n  a m o b i l e  I C B M  sys t em;  by  t h e  a u t o m o b i l e  and  
pe t ro leum i n d u s t r i e s  as  a means o f  expand ing  t h e i r  m a r k e t s ;  
and by t h e  m i d d l e - c l a s s  dream o f  owning t h e i r  own i n d i v i d u a l  
home w i t h  a g a r d e n .  
The method o f  f i n a n c i n g  chosen  was t o  impose a modest  
t a x  o f  a few c e n t s  p e r  g a l l o n  on motor  v e h i c l e  f u e l s  a c r o s s  
t h e  n a t i o n .  P r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s  and t r u c k i n g  companies  h a v e  
c o n t r i b u t e d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  f u n d i n g ;  s t a t e  gove rnmen t s  
have c o n t r i b u t e d  some s t a t e d  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  c o s t s  o f  e a c h  
p r o j e c t  and have  assumed t h e  b u r d e n  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  s y s t e m .  
The b e n e f i c i a r i e s  have  been  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be t h e  m o t o r i s t s  
who have c o n t r i b u t e d  most o f  t h e  f u n d i n g ,  i n  t h e  fo rm of b e t t e r  
h ighways ,  greater  c o n v e n i e n c e ,  and i n c r e a s e d  o p t i o n s  i n  c h o o s i n g  
where  t o  l i v e  and where t o  work.  
An S P S  program c o u l d  be s u p p o r t e d  a n a l o g o u s l y .  A modest  
t a x  on each  u n i t  o f  ene rgy  consumed ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  e l e c t r i c a l  
e n e r g y )  c o u l d  be channe led  i n t o  a f e d e r a l  t r u s t  f u n d  t o  f i n a n c e  
t h e  R & D  phase  and t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  s t a r t - u p  c o s t s .  The long-  
term b e n e f i t s  t o  ene rgy  consumers  who p a i d  t h e  t a x e s  i n t o  t h e  
t r u s t  f u n d  would b e  r e d u c e d  e n e r g y  c o s t s  f o r  t h e  SPS r e l a t i v e  t o  
o t h e r  energy a l t e r n a t i v e s  n o t  iniplemented b y  t h e  f e d e r a l  
Zc-Jernnent .  ?lclvs f c r  t h i s  shezc  a r e  shc:!r, i n  F i g u r e  7 .  
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U t i l i t y  r a t e s  a r e  r e g u l a t e d  a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e  b y  e a c h  o f  
t h e  s t a t e s .  I n  most c a s e s ,  u t i l i t y  companies  a re  p r o h i b i t e d  f rom 
c h a r g i n g  more  t h a n  t o k e n  e x p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  R&D on f u t u r e  e n e r g y  
t e c h n o l o g i e s  t o  c u r r e n t  r a t e s .  F e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  o v e r r i d i n g  
t h e s e  s t a t e  p o l i c i e s  and p r a c t i c e s  would b e  r e q u i r e d ,  p o s s i b l y  
t r i g g e r i n g  a " s t a t e s  r i g h t s "  b a t t l e .  
T o t a l  U.S. e l e c t r i c a l  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  1974 was 1 . 8 6 5  x 10l2 kwhr.  
Assuming a t a x  of  2 m i l l s / k w h r  on e l e c t r i c i t y  d e l i v e r e d  t o  consumers ,  
more t h a n  $ 4  b i l l i o n  p e r  y e a r  c o u l d  b e  c o l l e c t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 8 0 ' s  
by t h i s  means. Comparing t h i s  f i g u r e  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  f o r  t h e  
F&D program as shown i n  T a b l e  I - A ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
f u n d s  could  be a c c u m u l a t e d  ( a t  i n t e r e s t )  i n  a p e r i o d  o f  l ess  t h a n  
s i x  y e a r s  b e f o r e  s t a r t i n g  t h e  R & D  program;  if t h e  t a x  were a t  a 
lower  r a t e  or if i t  b e g a n  c o n c u r r e n t l y  w i t h  t h e  R & D  program,  t h e  
t a x  would have t o  c o n t i n u e  f o r  as l o n g  as t e n  y e a r s .  A t  p r e s e n t  
r a t e s  f o r  e l e c t r i c i t y ,  t h i s  t a x  would a f f e c t  t h e  c o s t  t o  consumers  
b y  l ess  t h a n  5 % .  
Some of  t h e  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  t h i s  approach  i n c l u d e  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  i t  p l a c e s  t h e  b u r d e n  o f  c o s t  and r i s k  on t h o s e  who u s e  t h e  
most energy a n d  t h u s  p u s h  t h e  demand f o r  new g e n e r a t i n g  c a p a c i t y  
t h e  mos t .  D i s a d v a n t a g e s  i n c l u d e  a l l  t h o s e  men t ioned  e a r l i e r  
f o r  government a g e n c i e s .  
5 .  Long-term government  bonds- -"Federa l  N a t i o n a l  Space  
P r o j e c t s  A s s o c i a t i o n . "  Long-term bonds would p r o v i d e  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  
w i t h  g r e a t e r  f reedom o f  c h o i c e  f o r  i n v e s t o r s  t h a n  f u n d i n g  b y  e i t h e r  
g e n e r a l  t a x  r e v e n u e s  o r  e n e r g y  u s e r  t a x e s .  The F e d e r a l  N a t i o n a l  
Mortgage A s s o c i a t i o n  ( " F a n n i e  Mae" ) i s  a g o v e r n m e n t - c h a r t e r e d  
c o r p o r a t i o n  which p r o v i d e s  mor tgage  f u n d s  f o r  homeowners t h r o u g h  
long- te rm bonds t r aded  on  t h e  bond m a r k e t .  The Bonds a r e  i s s u e d  
a t  a p r i c e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l o w e r  t h a n  t h e i r  m a t u r i t y  v a l u e ;  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e s e  two p r i c e s  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  a n  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  o v e r  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e  bond which r e f l e c t s  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  com- 
m u n i t y ' s  s e n s e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  i s s u e  of  t h e  medium-to-long-term 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The bonds  t h e m s e l v e s  a r e  s u b s e q u e n t l y  t r aded  
d u r i n g  t h e i r  l i f e  a t  a m a r k e t  p r i c e  which d e c l i n e s  when i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  go up t o  p r o v i d e  a n  e f f e c t i v e  y i e l d  e q l i i v a l e n t  t o  compe t i -  
t i v e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  A s  m a t u r i t y  a p p r o a c h e s ,  t h e  marke t  v a l u e  
approaches  t h e  m a t u r i t y  v a l u e  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  
o f  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  
Fannie  Mae i s  s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g ;  bonds  a re  redeemed a t  m a t u r i t y  
from t h e  p r i n c i p a l  and i n t e r e s t  payments  o f  mortgage b o r r o w e r s .  
The government assumes  some r i s k  i n  c a s e  o f  d e f a u l t s  by a s i g n i -  
f i c a n t  f r a c t i o n  of t h e  b o r r o w e r s .  S p e c u l a t i v e  i n v e s t o r s  a b s o r b  
t h e  ga ins  (or l o s s e s )  d u e  t o  c h a n g i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  d u r i n g  t h e  
life o f  t h e  b c ? d s .  
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The f l o w s  o f  a u t h o r i t y  and  o f  f u n d i n g  f o r  a F e d e r a l  N a t i o n a l  
Space P r o j e c t s  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( " F a n n i e  Spray" )  a re  shown i n  F i g u r e  e .  
Fann ie  Spray would b e  s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g  i f  t h e  SPS p r o j e c t  came t o  
f r u i t i o n ;  o t h e r w i s e ,  t h e  T r e a s u r y  would e v e n t u a l l y  h a v e  t o  a b s o r b  
t h e  c o s t s  o f  r edeeming  t h e  bonds i s s u e d  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  R & D  p h a s e .  
To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i n f l a t i o n  exceeded  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  y i e l d  of t h e  
Space Bonds, t h e  u l t i m a t e  c o s t  of an abandoned SPS program t o  
t h e  t a x p a y e r s  would b e  l e s s e n e d  i n  compar ison  w i t h  f i n a n c i n g  
from c u r r e n t  t a x e s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  F a n n i e  S p r a y  c o u l d  r e p a y  
some of  t h e  c o s t s  o f  t h e  R & D  program b y  v i g o r o u s  m a r k e t i n g  of 
p a t e n t  l i c e n s i n g  r i g h t s  a c q u i r e d  d u r i n g  t h e  R & D  p h a s e .  ( T h i s  
would a l s o  a p p l y  t o  NASA, S U A ,  or USPS were s u f f i c i e n t  emphas i s  
g i v e n  t o  t h i s  k i n d  o f  m a r k e t i n g . )  
Adequate f u n d i n g  of  t h e  SPS R&D p h a s e  c o u l d  p r o b a b l y  b e  
a s s u r e d  i f  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  y i e l d  on t h e  Space  Bonds were s u f f i c i e n t l y  
h i g h  a t  d a t e  of i s s u e  t o  compete w i t h  o t h e r  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  t h e  
bond m a r k e t .  Assuming a 6 %  per  annum r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  ( b e f o r e  
i n f l a t i o n ) - - a  v e r y  s e v e r e  p e n a l t y  f o r  t h e  S P S  program--the t o t a l  
v a l u e  of bonds  p l u s  i n t e r e s t  o u t s t a n d i n g  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  R & D  
phase  would b e  $ 6 8 . 2 9  b i l l i o n .  ( S e e  t h e  compounded v a l u e  column 
i n  T a b l e  I - A . )  Assuming t h e  bonds were i s s u e d  f o r  20-year  maturit ; :  
( w i t h  t h e  o p t i o n  f o r  F a n n i e  Spray  t o  redeem bonds  p r i o r  t o  ma tu r i zy  
d a t e ) ,  t h i s  t o t a l  i n d e b t e d n e s s  c o u l d  be  p a i d  f o r  by  c h a r g i n g  
" l i c e n s i n g  f e e s "  of  $5 .954  b i l l i o n  each  y e a r  d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  
twenty y e a r s  o f  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  p h a s e .  I n  t h e  R e f e r e n c e  
Design t i m e t a b l e ,  t h i s  would imply a c o s t  t o  t h e  u t i l i t y  companies 
o f  $33 .482  b i l l i o n  f o r  1 0  G W  o f  g e n e r a t i n g  c a p a c i t y .  ( S e e  compounded 
v a l u e  column i n  T a b l e  I-B; add t h e  above l i c e n s i n g  f ee  t o  o b t a i n  
t h e  c a p i t a l  sum t o  b e  f i n a n c e d  by t h e  u t i l i t y . )  Assuming t h e  same 
6 %  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  p e r  y e a r ,  t h e  n e t  r e v e n u e s  would a m o r t i z e  
t h i s  t o t a l  c o s t  o v e r  a b o u t  17 y e a r s ,  a t i m e  s c a l e  which  seems t o  
s t r e t c h  c r e d u l i t y  even  i n  t h e  u t i l i t y  i n d u s t r y .  E i t h e r  F a n n i e  S p ~ 2 . y  
would have t o  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r e d u c e  t h e  c o s t  p e r  k i l o w a t t  f o r  SPS 
below t h e  R e f e r e n c e  Des ign ,  or t h e  Space  Bonds would h a v e  t o  b e  
s t r e t c h e d  t o  t h i r t y  yea r s  a l l o w i n g  a l o w e r  l i c e n s i n g  f e e ,  or t h e  
r a t e  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and s a l e s  o f  power s a t e l l i t e s  would have  t o  
b e  i n c r e a s e d  above 1 0  GW p e r  y e a r .  (Any of  t h e s e  a p p r o a c h e s  would 
improve t h e  pe r fo rmance  o f  any f i n a n c i n g  scheme d i s c u s s e d  h e r e .  ) 
Compared t o  t h e  t a x p a y e r  s t o c k  c o r p o r a t i o n  , F a n n i e  Spray  woLld 
b e  l e s s  a c c o u n t a b l e  t o  t h e  t a x p a y e r s .  P s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
Space Bonds would  compete d i r e c t l y  w i t h  o t h e r  n e e d s  for c a p i t a l  
f u n d i n g  i n  a way t h a t  t a x e s  do  n o t .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  s i n c e  
bond f i n a n c i n g  would n o t  a p p e a r  as a l i n e - i t e m  i n  the f e d e r a l  
b u d g e t ,  i t  would b e  far e a s i e r  t o  o b t a i n  p u b l i c  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h i s  
method of f i n a n c i n g  t h a n  f o r  d i r e c t  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  t o  an  SPS prog.-am. 
Unless t h e  c h a r l t e r  o f  Farinie Spray  were o r g a n i z e d  along l i n e 2  
s imi l a r  t o  p r i v a t e  c ~ n t e r p r i s e  c o r p o r a t i c n s  ( a s  i s  t h e  c a s e - - t o  
a c e r t a i n  ex t -en t - -wi th  b'arinie Mae), i t  would b e  hampered b y  t h e  
management 1 i : i t ) i  l it  o f  gover'ilment a g e n c i e s  i n  R e n e r a l .  
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6. The staging company approach--1nternstional Satellite 
Industries, Inc. Thus far, the only proposal of which we are 
aware for private funding of an SPS program a l l  the way through 
from R&D to commercial implementation is the staging company 
concept of Basler.(8) The staging company concept recognizes 
the essential qualitative differences between the R&D and the 
implementation phases of an SPS program. The principa9 challenge 
to private financing is the length of the R&D phase during which 
large expenditures are required without any hope of revenues. 
Once an SPS program has been demonstrated to have low economic 
and technological risks, i.e., once the utility industry can be 
assured that an SPS ordered at a certain time can be delivered 
with reasonable certainty on o r  before some specified date at 
a cost known within narrow uncertainty limits, implementation 
can proceed at a rapid pace with normal financing methods. 
How can the R&D phase be funded privately if no revenues 
can be expected for ten or fifteen years? The idea of the staging 
company is based in part on the economic value of new technology 
itself. Instead of relying on dividend income during the R&D 
phase, investors who are willing to be somewhat speculative could 
expect capital appreciation of their shares in a staging company: 
the accumulation of technological advances and of patent rights 
would make possible future profits whose anticipation would push 
up  the value of the staging company’s shares. 
International Satellite Industries, Inc., has already been 
incorporated (August 3, 1978, in the State of Delaware), as a 
partially closed-end non-diversified management in;restment company. 
(In effect, IS1 is a kind of mutual fund.) A conventional mutual 
fund would distribute most of its dividend earnings and capital 
gains distributions from its investments to its shareholders. 
IS1 would instead spend substantially all of its income on R&D 
contracts directed toward power satellites. To stretch the funds 
available from its portfolio income, IS1 intends to contract for 
R&D primarily with companies willing to share the costs of R&D as 
joint venturers. Patent rights directly related to SPS would be 
controlled by I S I ;  other patent rights could be reserved to the 
joint venturers or shared with ISI. The joint venturers would 
receive options to purchase IS1 stock after its conversion from 
an investment company into an operating company. 
As originally envisioned by Basler, the staging company would 
invest primarily in aerospace companies and other high-technology 
companies likely to profit frorri space industrialization. Through 
the R&D process, IS1 would gain significant insight into the 
praspective pi>ofitability of such companies. IS1 would then be able 
to make its investment decisions with a high degree of confidence. 
The market’s appreciation of ISI’s confidence in the future 
profitability of such companies would exert strong upward pressure 
on the value of shares in which IS1 had invested, increasing the 
value of the staging company’s portfolio and thus the value of 
R & D .  (Figure 9-A shows the f lows  f o r  the stagii-ig company phase.) 
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(This mechanism is not descrlibed in ISI's preliminary prospectus 
draft; it is not very likely to play an important role in ISI's 
investment decisions during the first year or two, but should become 
increasingly significant.) 
Once the prospect for successful commercial implementation 
of an SPS program is assured to the satisfaction of ISI's stock- 
holders, the company would convert into an operating company and 
commence space operations using more conventional financing methods 
including advance sales of power satellites to utility companies. 
In the operating company phase, the relevant flows would be as 
shown in Figure 9-B. 
As a private enterprise, IS1 would be free of many of the 
disadvantages of government agencies. From the very start, its 
funding would be international in character, and it woLild be very 
easy for IS1 to create' subsidiaries in other countries as necessary 
or convenient to become fully multinational, all without the 
necessity of lengthy State Department negotiations as would be 
necessary for an SPS organization based on government agencies. 
IS1 would also be far more free than a U.S. government agency to 
select an equatorial launch site for its operations, with signi- 
ficant savings possibilities due to the improved performance of 
space transport to geosynchronous equatorial orbit. Sales of 
power satellites and of maintenance services to foreign 
countries could be facilitated by the use of subsidiary or 
affiliate companies incorporated in the customer nations. 
Perhaps the major advantage of the staging company approach 
as far as early implementation of an SPS program is concerned 
is its ability as a private company to proceed without waiting 
for widespread political support prior to a go-ahead from Congress. 
At the same time, the magnitude of the required R&D effort may 
strain the available capital sources for speculative investments. 
Yet this would encourage IS1 to aggressively seek the most in- 
novative and inexpensive design approaches to an SPS system. 
Should the IS1 model show even partial success, it would provide 
a valuable new model for financing long-term projects such as Ocean 
Thermal Electric Conversion which are presently beyond the reach 
of private investment and lack sufficient political support f o r  
substantial federal funding. 
In Figure 3, I S 1  is shown as a competitive corporation. 
Should sufficient speculative investment funds be available, 
more than one staging company may be formed, each following 
a slightly different program toward SPS commercialization. It 
seems unlikely, however, that the stock market could support 
more than one SPS staging company in the near future, so that 
IS1 is likely to be alone in the field until commercialization 
approaches very closely. The patent rights secured by IS1 would 
serve to preserve a very strong competitive edge for the original 
stagir,g company which took the long-term, early risks. 
-41- 
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7. Government-chartered monopoly--"Solar Satellite Corporation." 
In the early 1 9 6 0 ' ~ ~  the success of several experimental communica- 
tions satellites demonstrated the feasibility of establishing glo- 
bal communications services by satellite. The problem of implementa- 
tion then was to find a way to finance and manage a novel system 
within the framework of an existing and highly regulated industry, 
recognizing that an indeterminate number of years would be required 
before economic break-even. 
The response to this opportunity and challenge was the 
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, signed into law by President 
Kennedy in August 1962. This Act authorized the creation of a 
private corporation, subject to governmental regulation, to establish 
in cooporation with entities from other nations a commercial com- 
munications satellite system on a global scale. As such, COMSAT 
was created as an instrument of national policy but not an agency 
of the U.S. government. 
COMSAT was incorporated in the District of Columbia on 
February 1, 1963. The enabling act did not guarantee funds in- 
vested in the stock of the corporation, the payment of dividends, 
or the profitability of the venture, but it did include a compre- 
hensive plan for the conduct of the business of COMSAT, including 
government supervision of some matters that are not ordinarily 
subject to such control in the case of other communications common 
carriers in the U.S. The President was to approve COMSAT's Articles 
of Incorporation, to exercise authority over the relationships 
of COMSAT with foreign governments and entities, and to appoint 
three of the fifteen Directors of the corporation for three-year 
terms of office. The Federal Communications Commission was re- 
quired to regulate COMSAT, including its rate structure. 
In any offering of common stock, COMSAT was required to 
tender 50% of the issfie for purchase by communications common 
carriers authorized to purchase such shares by the FCC. Shares 
not purchased by authorized carriers could then be offered to 
the general public along with the other 50% of the issue. The 
initial offering of 10,000,000 shares at $20 per share was made 
in June, 1964. A total of 163 authorized carriers subscribed 
for the reserved 5,000,000 shares, the remaining 5,000,000 
being sold through registered brokerage firms acting as underwriters, 
raising a total of $200 million in initial capitalization. 
The common carriers vote their shares to elect six Directors 
of COMSAT for a one-year term, and general public share-holders 
elect six more Directors for a one-year term. Each of the fifteen 
Directors has the same obligations to the corporation and to all 
its shareholders, regardless of the constituency electing or appoinf,- 
ing them. 
Although no dividends were paid on shares of COMSAT until 
COMSAT has raid quarterly 
the fourth quarter of 1970, the market price of the shares rapidly 
soared above $50, purely on glamor. 
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dividends ever since, and at the end of 1977 showed a total share- 
holder's equity of about $355 million; with net income for. the 
year of $32.5 million. With 8 million shares outstanding (the 
rest having been repurchased by COMSAT), equity per share was $44.38. 
Operating revenues were $168.2 million. ( 10) 
In August 1964, an international entity was formed for the 
purpose of establishing and managing the global satellite com- 
munications system. INTELSAT, the International Telecommunications 
Satellite Organization was established by multinational accords, 
under which each nation wishing to participate in the system dele- 
gated an entity (either a government agency or a chartered corpora- 
tion) to act as its representative. As a natural "first among 
equals," COMSAT was contracted by INTETSAT to manage the system, 
with INTELSAT collecting monthly bills for dues and use charges. 
Presently INTELSAT has 600 satellite pathways providing direct 
satellite communication services to more than 85 nations; landlines 
and microwave links extend these services to more than 120 nations. 
(Figure 10 shows the relationship of COXSAT to the U.S.  government 
and to INTELSAT and other nations.) 
A similar organizational arrangement could be used for 
the commercialization of an SPS program. Because of the much 
larger R&D costs anticipated for SPS than for the communications 
satellites, it is unlikely that glamor alone could provide the 
basis for capitalization totaling tens of billions of dollars 
for an extended period prior to payment of dividends. On the 
other hand, capitalization of a few billion dollars, combined 
with firm orders for SPS delivery to utility companies, would 
provide the leverage necessary f o r  a "Solar Satellite Corporation" 
to borrow large funds for construction. Such capitalization 
should be available from a coxbination of corporate and individual 
investors. Figure 11 shows the flows assumed under this model, 
in which "SOLARSAT" would be chartered by act o f  Congress to 
establish a global SPS system. 
entity analogous to INTELSAT could follow rapidly. In contrast to 
the INTELSAT system, however, it is unlikely that most member 
nations would be willing to have the international organization 
maintain title to the power satellites but would prefer to buy 
them outright. 
Once "SOLARSAT" is operating, the formation of an internation2.1 
Although INTELSAT has used COMSAT as a manager under contract, 
it is not permanently committed to do so. Neither is COMSAT thus 
constrained to use U.S. launch vehicles but may use any available 
competitive system. The European Space Agency's ARIANE vehicle 
may prove to be competitive in cost, as may OTRAG's privately 
developed booster which has had several suborbital test flights 
from Zaire. Similarly, an international SPS organization such 
as described here would be free to hire any of its member organi- 
zations to act as managers or contractors for construction and 
m a i n t e n a n c e  cf 1- ~ c r  ~2tcllltes. 
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8. The c o n s o r t i u m  model.  Confronted  w i t h  v e r y  l a r g e  p r o j e c t s  
o f  modera te  r i s k ,  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  have  f r e q u e n t l y  t u r n e d  t o  
t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a n  ad hoc consor t ium t o  d i s t r i b u t e  t h e  management 
o f  t h e  p r o j e c t  and t h e  i n v e s t m e n t s  r e q u i r e d  s o  t h a t  none o f  t h e  
p a r t n e r s  i n  t h e  v e n t u r e  i s  o v e r e x t e n d e d .  Some r e c e n t  p r o j e c t s  
which have s u c c e s s f u l l y  used  t h i s  method i n c l u d e  t h e  Alaska 
p i p e l i n e ,  t he  Nor th  Sea  o i l  f i e l d s ,  a n d  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  some 
la rge  base - load  e l e c t r i c a l  g e n e r a t i n g  p l a n t s .  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  R iyad ,  i t  s o l i c i t e d  b i d s  f o r  t h e  t o t a l  p r o j e c t  f rom 
e n g i n e e r i n g  companies a round t h e  wor ld .  The low b i d  ( f o r  $3 .4  
b i l l i o n )  was s u b m i t t e d  by a conso r t ium formed f o r  t h i s  p r o j e c t  
by Bouyges ( P a r i s ,  F r a n c e )  and B loun t ,  I n c .  (Montgomery, Alabama).  
Although t h r e e  o t h e r  c o n s o r t i a  a l s o  s u b m i t t e d  b i d s ,  a f i f t h  
combine e l e c t e d  n o t  t o  b i d  because  t h e  p r o j e c t  was s t i l l  t o o  
large f o r  them t o o  manage. P r e s e n t l y ,  t h e  Saud i  government  h a s  
begun t o  b u i l d  a n  e n t i r e  new c i t y  i n  n o r t h e a s t e r n  S a u d i  Arabia 
t o  b e  c a l l e d  King K h a l i d  Mili tary C i t y .  The t o t a l  p r o j e c t  w i l l  
c o s t  more t h a n  $7 b i l l i o n ,  and w i l l  b e  c o n t r a c t e d  o u t  u n d e r  some 
34 d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r a c t s  r a n g i n g  i n  c o s t  f rom $100- t o  $150-mi l l i on .  
C o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  s u p p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  these  c o n t r a c t o r s ,  
however,  i s  a s i n g l e  p r o j e c t  o f  abou t  $1 b i l l i o n ;  t h i s  t a s k  has b e e n  
awarded t o  Morrison-Knudsen Saudi  Arabia Consort iurn,  a combine 
which i n c l u d e s  Morrison-Knudsen o f  Arabia, I n c .  ( B o i s e ,  I d a h o ) ;  
F i s c h b a c h  and Moore I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o r p o r a t i o n  (Dallas,  Texas )  ; 
and a Dutch c o n c r e t e  c o n s u l t a n t ,  I n t e r b e t o n  C o n s t r u c t i o n  N . V .  
( C u r a c a o ) . ( l l )  
When the  S a u d i  Arab ian  government d e c i d e d  t o  b u i l d  t h e  new 
While a c o n s o r t i u m  can  b r e a k  up a l a r g e  p r o j e c t  i n t o  s m a l l e r  
p i e c e s  which c a n  b e  managed by e x i s t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  t h i s  o r g a n i -  
z a t i o n a l  a r rangement  cannot  change t h e  t i m e  s c a l e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  
a n  a c c e p t a b l e  r e tu rn -on- inves tmen t  and an a c c e p t a b l e  l e v e l  of  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  The conso r t ium would t h u s  have t o  r e l y  on R&D work 
p r e v i o u s l y  p a i d  f o r  by o t h e r s ,  e i t h e r  a government  agency or 
a s t a g i n g  company. Flows a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  c o n s o r t i u m  model a r e  
shown i n  F i g u r e  1 2 .  
Because o f  t h e  l a rge  s c a l e  o f  an  SPS c o n s t r u c t i o n  program,  
s e v e r a l  d i s t i n c t  c o n s o r t i a  may en te r  t h e  f i e l d ,  p r o v i d i n g  t h e  
c l a s s i c a l  b e n e f i t s  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  and  a v o i d i n g  t h e  r i s k s  of ex-  
c e s s i v e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  power. U t i l i t y  companies  cou ld  shop  
a round  f o r  t h e  bes t  b a r g a i n  a v a i l a b l e  t o  them, j u s t  as t h e y  p r e -  
s e n t l y  c a n  buy t u r b o g e n e r a t o r s  from West inghouse  or f rom G e n e r a l  
E l e c t r i c  o r  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  m a n u f a c t u r e r s .  S e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  c o n s o r t i a  
may a l s o  b e  ab le  t o  o f f e r  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  SPS d e s i g n s  and s i z e s ,  
f a c i l i t a t i n g  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  power s a t e l l i t e s  i n t o  e x i s t i n g  g r i d s .  
Such a n  approach  would c l e a r l y  minimize m i l i t a r y  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
of t h e  SPS program. 
Consor t ium p a r t n e r s  would be f i n a n c e d  by  a combina t ion  o f  
s t o c k s ,  long- te rm bonds ,  and advance d e p o s i t s  on u t i l i t y  company 
o r d e r s  f o r  power s a t e l l i t e s ,  w i t h  l i t t l e  or no government s u p p o r t  
beyond t h e  i n i t i a l  R & D  s u p p o r t .  
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9. The corporate socialism model. Perhaps the earliest 
application of this idea was the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862 
designed for the purpose of creating a transcontinental railroad. 
The act created the Union Pacific Railroad and authorized the 
Central Pacific Railroad to participate as well. The basic 
premise was that if the nation as a whole needed a particular 
project to be done, the taxpayers should help to pay for it by 
supporting private enterprise in both of its classic endeavors: 
getting the job done and making a profit b y  doing the job. 
The Pacific Railroad Act gave the railroads an outright grant 
of right-of-way through public lands and additional lands for each 
mile of track completed. The railroads also received payment in 
the form of 30-year U.S. bonds, principal and interest payable 
at maturity. Due to insufficient safeguards, the situation was 
exploited by the infamous Credit Mobilier, but the job was completed 
by 1869 and all loans advanced to the railroads were completely 
repaid by 1895. (12) 
Preferential tax treatment has been used in several other 
countries much more extensively than in the United States. At 
the end of World War 11, Sweden was still an agrarian economy. 
The government decided to stimulate the development of industry 
by a combination of incentives favoring private investments in 
new technologies. Thirty years later, Sweden is a major industrial 
nation producing some of the most sophisticated military aircraft 
in the world and earning significant export revenues from sales 
of automobiles throughout the world. (13) During the last ten 
or fifteen years, the Republic of Ireland has deliberately encouraged 
foreign industry to establish new factories in Ireland by offering 
exemption from all corporate taxes for up to ten years. 
Similar incentives for private industry in such a new and 
sophisticated technology as SPS could stimulate not only the 
commercialization phase of an SPS program but part of the R&D 
phase as .well. 
With more sophisticated safeguards, available today, an 
SPS program could be carried through by private enterprise com- 
panies using a combination of equity financing through the public 
stock and bond markets, government guaranteed loans, government 
loans, outright government grants and subsidies, preferential 
tax treatment, and other incentives. In return for this support, 
the taxpayers would receive diffuse and indirect benefits including 
technological spin-offs, stimulation of economlc growth, and 
(eventually) reduced energy costs. The flows involved for the 
corporate socialism model for SPS are shown in Figure 13. 
Advantages of this approach include its historical familiarity 
and its diffusion of financial, management, and employment parti- 
cipation over a very wide base. Disadvantages may include the 
difficulty of coordinating such a diversified operation, although 
the Marshall Plan after World War I1 used a wide array of private 
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companies and government a g e n c i e s  v e r y  s u c c e s s f u l l y .  ( 5 )  
I n  t h e  p r e s e n t  p o l i t i c a l  c l i m a t e ,  however ,  p o l i t i c a l  a c c e p t a -  
b i l i t y  of  a p r o p o s a l  t o  p o u r  b i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s  a year  o f  t h e  
t a x p a y e r s '  money i n t o  a s e l e c t  few a e r o s p a c e  companies  would be 
low. ( C o n s i d e r  t h e  Lockheed l o a n  g u a r a n t e e ,  which ended up 
c o s t i n g  t h e  t a x p a y e r s  n o t h i n g ,  y e t  c r e a t e d  a ma jo r  b a t t l e  i n  
Congress  b e c a u s e  of  t he  magni tude  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  r i s k . )  
1 0 .  The u n i v e r s a l  c a p i t a l i s m  model .  I n  t h e i r  book How t o  
Turn  E i g h t y  MiZZion Workers  Into C a p i t a Z i s t s  on  Borrowed Money, 
Loui s  0 .  Kelso  and P a t r i c i a  H e t t e r  p roposed  a fundamen ta l  economic 
r e f o r m  t o  improve t h e  per formance  o f  t h e  U.S. economy. Th i s  p l a n  
i s  based on t h e  t h e o r y  o f  u n i v e r s a l  c a p i t a l i s m  ( a l t e r n a t i v e l y  
known as t h e  t w o - f a c t o r  t h e o r y  of economics )  deve loped  i n  t h e  
books o f  Kelso  and Mort imer  J .  A d l e r ,  The C a p i t a Z i s t  M a n i f e s t o  
and The New C a p i t a Z i s t s  ( 9 ) .  The b a s i c  model i s  summarized i n  
Appendix 11; i t s  s p e c i f i c  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  SPS c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  
program i s  d i s c u s s e d  here .  
The b a s i c  pu rpose  of Ke l so  and H e t t e r l s  p l a n  i s  t o  promote 
t h e  ownersh ip  o f  c a p i t a l  ( p r i n c i p a l l y  i n  *.he form o f  shares of  
s t o c k )  by wage e a r n e r s  and by welfare r e - i p i e n t s  t h r o u g h o u t  s o c i e t y .  
By s e t t i n g  u n i v e r s a l  owner sh ip  of c a p i t a l  as a n a t i o n a l  g o a l  i n s t e a d  
o f  ( o r  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o )  t h e  g o a l  of u n i v e r s a l  employment,  everyone  
would e v e n t u a l l y  have  a second  income from d i v i d e n d s  i n  a d d i t i o n  
t o  a n  income from wages or w e l f a r e .  If t h e  d i v i d e n d  income became 
large enough,  most welfare payments c o u l d  e v e n t u a l l y  b e  e l i m i n a t e d .  
To a c c o m p l i s h  these  g o a l s ,  Congress  would have  t o  f i s t  c h a r t e r  a 
"Cap i t a l  D i f f u s i o n  I n s u r a n c e  C o r p o r a t i o n . "  ( A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  e x i s t i n g  
i n s u r a n c e  companies c o u l d  assume t h e  same r o l e  unde r  s u i t a b l e  
e n a b l i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n . )  I n d i v i d u a l s  d e s i r i n g  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  
p l a n  would pay a l o a n  i n s u r a n c e  premium t o  C D I C  and borrow money 
f rom c o n v e n t i o n a l  l e n d i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  p u r c h a s e  shares . ,  A s  
i n s u r e r  of  t hese  l o a n s ,  C D I C  would m a i n t a i n  a l i s t  o f  approved 
v e n t u r e s  which C D I C  b e l i e v e d  were r e a s o n a b l y  safe i n v e s t m e n t s .  
The i n d i v i d u a l  would p u r c h a s e  s h a r e s  w i t h  t h e  l o a n ;  t h e  shares would 
be h e l d  as c o l l a t e r a l  u n t i l  t h e  l o a n s  ( i n c l u d i n g  i n t e r e s t )  had been  
r e p a i d  o u t  of t h e  d i v i d e n d s  o f  t h e  shares p u r c h a s e d .  I f  t h e  shares 
became w o r t h l e s s ,  or i f  t h e y  paid i n s u f f i c i e n t  d i v i d e n d s  t o  pay  o f f  
t h e  l o a n ,  C D I C  would b a i l  o u t  t h e  l e n d i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n .  I n  most c a s e s ,  
t h e  d i v i d e n d s  would pay o f f  t h e  l o a n s  i n  5 t o  7 p rov ided  
t h e  d i v i d e n d s  were p a i d  o u t  o f  p r e - t a x  d o l l a r s .  
Were s u c h  a r e f o r m  t o  b e  implemented,  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  
phase  of  t h e  SPS program c o u l d  b e  f i n a n c e d  s i m i l a r l y .  F i g u r e  1 4  
shows t h e  f lows  o f  c a p i t a l  and o f  a u t h o r i t y  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  an  
SPS o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  t h i s  model .  T h i s  would have  many of  t h e  same 
b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  t a x p a y e r  s t o c k  c o r p o r a t i o n ;  s i n c e  i t  p r e s u p p o s e s  
t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  Congres s  and t h e  E x e c u t i v e  t o  c a r r y  t h r o u g h  a 
v e r y  large s c a l e  economic r e fo rm,  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  v i a b i l i t y  would 
seem t o  be low. It  i s  n o t  l i k e l y  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  and i d e o l o g i c a l  
biases oppos ing  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  ideas here  c o u l d  be overcome 
p u r e l y  by t h e  l u r e  of i n e x p e n s i v e  e l e c t r i c a l  power from SPS. On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  i t  s h o u l d  be borne  i n  mind t h a t  v e r y  l a r g e  s c a l e  
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p r o j e c t s  i n  che p a s t  have  sometimes been  c a r r i e d  o u t  f o r  t h e  
d e l i b e r a t e  p u r p o s e  o f  r e f o r m i n g  t h e  economic,  s o c i a l ,  and 
p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  a n a t i o n .  (The c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  
Great P y r a m i d s  a t  Giza  seems t o  have been  d e l i b e r a t e l y  geared 
t o  u n i t i n g  t h e  N o r t h e r n  and S o u t h e r n  Kingdoms of E g y p t . )  Should  
t h e  i d e a s  o f  u n i v e r s a l  c a p i t a l i s m  become p o l i t i c a l l y  d e s i r a b l e ,  
t h e  SPS Frogram c o u l d  become . the v e h i c l e  f o r  t h i s  d e l i b e r a t e  
r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  economy. Some f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  
s o c i a l  and economic b e n e f i t s  o f  u n i v e r s a l  c a p i t a l i s m  c a n  b e  found 
i n  ( 1 4 ) .  
PHASED APPROACHES 
From t h e  above  d i s c u s s i o n ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  many d i f f e r e n t  
ways o f  c a r r y i n g  o u t  a n  SPS program a re  l i k e l y  t o  b e  w o r k a b l e .  
It i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  i n  a c t u a l  p r a c t i c e  no s i n g l e  form w i l l  be  u s e d  
f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  d u r a t i o n  of t h e  program. Even i f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
S a t e l l i t e  I n d u s t r i e s ,  I n c . ,  were  t h e  o n l y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  which 
a c t u a l l y  se ts  o u t  t o  c a r r y  o u t  a n  SPS program, i t  would make u s e  
of  R & D  e f f o r t s  by DOE and  N A S A  i n  i t s  own p rograms .  Thus t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  phased  a p p r o a c h e s  shou ld  b s  k e p t  i n  mind i n  any 
f u r t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  SPS f i n a n c i n g  and  management. 
V a r i o u s  h y b r i d  c a s e s  may a l s o  be  worthy o f  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  
During t h e  R & D  p h a s e ,  f o r  example,  i t  may b e  des i r ab le  and a d v a n t a -  
geous t o  have e x i s t i n g  a g e n c i e s  ( s u c h  as DOE and NASA) s u p p o r t e d  
by a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  from g e n e r a l  t a x a t i o n ,  by  v e r y  modest, ene rgy  
u s e r  t a x e s ,  and by Space  Bonds, w i t h  t h e  bonds redeemable from 
g e n e r a l  t a x  r e v e n u e s  s h o u l d  no commercial  p r o d u c t s  or s e r v i c e s  
i n  f a c t  m a t e r i a l i z e  f rom t h e  R & D  phase .  
I n  view o f  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  t h e  R & D  phase  whlch s t i l l  l i e s  ahead, 
i t  i s  d e f i n i t e l y  p r e m a t u r e  a t  t h i s  t i m e  t o  make any d e c i s i o n s  
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  phase  of  an SPS program,  even  i f  
f u l l  s c a l e  committment i s  made t o  t h e  R & D  p h a s e .  Most l i k e l y  no  
r e a l l y  sound basis  f o r  d e c i s i o n  on whe the r  t o  p r o c e e d  w i t h  t h e  
f u l l  DDT&E program c a n  be made u n t i l  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t i o n  o f  
t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  p h a s e  has b e e n  comple ted ;  i t  would seem t o  be  
r e a s o n a b l e  f o r  DOE and  NASA t o  pu r sue  such  a program w i t h i n  t h e  
p r e s e n t  framework o f  a n n u a l  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  from g e n e r a l  t a x  f u n d s .  
One drawback t o  a phased approach  i n  which t h e  R & D  e f f o r t  
i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  by a d i f f e r e n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  from t h a t  which w i l l  
a c t u a l l y  b u i l d  and  s e l l  t h e  power s a t e l l i t e s  i s  t h a t  t h e  R & D  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  would have  l i m i t e d  m o t i v a t i o n  f o r  r e d u c i n g  t h e  c o s t s  
p e r  k i l o w a t t  o f  t h e  power s a t e l l i t e s ,  and would have  s t r o n g  mot iva-  
t i o n  f o r  p r o l o n g i n g  t h e  R & D  phase .  P e r h a p s  t h e s e  problems c o u l d  
be a l l e v i a t e d  by u s i n g  two o r  more  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  p a r a l l e l  and 
i n  c o m p e t i t i o n .  To some e x t e n t ,  t h i s  w i l l  happen be tween  DOE/NASA 
and IS1 s h o u l d  I S 1  r a i se  s u f f i c i e n t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  t o  u n d e r t a k e  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  l e v e l  of  R & D  toward SPS. 
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COMPARATIVE E V A L U A T I O N  
Our p r e l i m i n a r y ,  q u s l i t a t i v e ,  and h i g h l y  s u b j e c t i v e  a s s e s s m e n t  
I of  t h e  t e n  a l t e r n a t i v e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  forms  f o r  SPS i s  summarized 
i n  T a b l e  11. The summary t a b l e  shows t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  f i v e  forms 
( a l l  of them p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e )  a p p e a r  mor f a v o r a b l e  t h a n  do 
t h e  p u r e l y  gove rnmen ta l  f o r m s ,  t h e  f i r s t  f i v e  on t h e  l i s t .  T h i s  
p r e f e r e n c e  i s  i n  l a rge  measure  due  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c r i t e r i a  
d i s c u s s e d  e a r l i e r  a r e  s t r o n g l y  t i l t e d  toward  measurement  of t h e  
pe r fo rmance  o f  a n  SPS o r g a n i z a t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  
p h a s e ,  w i t h  l ess  w e i g h t  g i v e n  t o  p e r f o r m a n c e  d u r i n g  t h e  R&D p h a s e .  
Under s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  a p p r o a c h e s  c o u l d  be 
e x p e c t e d  t o  b e  s t r o n g l y  f a v o r e d  i n  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n .  
A s  f a r  a s  pe r fo rmance  d u r i n g  t h e  R & D  p h a s e  i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  w e  
have  l i t t l e  basis  f o r  e x p e c t i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  among 
t h e  v a r i o u s  gove rnmen ta l  forms d i s c u s s e d ,  e x c e p t  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s :  
(1) An SPS R&D program might  t e n d  t o  "ge t  l o s t  i n  t h e  
s h u f f l e "  i n  l a r g e  mul t i -p rogram o r g a n i z a t i o n s  s u c h  
as DOE or NASA. 
( 2 )  With c h a r t e r  exempt ion  from C i v i l  S e r v i c e  p r o c e d u r e s ,  
a new o r g a n i z a t i o n  would a v o i d  some o f  t h e  s e v e r e  
m a n a g e r i a l  h a n d i c a p s  o f  most  government  a g e n c i e s .  
( 3 )  T h e  t a x p a y e r  s t o c k  company a p p r o a c h  h a s  some p r o f i t  
m o t i v e s  t o  push i t s  R & D  p h a s e  toward  i n n o v a t i o n  and 
b r e a k t h r o u g h .  
A l l  of  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  f o r  SPS would have  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  a c h i e v i n g  a c o n v i n c i n g  s e p a r a t i o n  f rom t h e  
m i l i t a r y ,  l e a v i n g  ma jo r  c o n c e r n  a b o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
s t r a t e g i c  d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  I n  t h e  f a c e  of u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s p a c e  law, i t  i s  h i g h l y  d o u b t f u l  t h a t  any of  t h e s e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  c o u l d  a c t  d e c i s i v e l y .  B u r e a u c r a t i c  i n e r t i a  may 
make i t  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  any o f  t h e s e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t o  move 
r a p i d l y ,  r e t a r d i n g  t h e  impact  o f  t h e  SPS program on U.S. e n e r g y  
s u p p l y .  Except  f o r  t h e  h y b r i d  forms  ( s u c h  as t h e  t a x p a y e r  s t o c k  
c o r p o r a t i o n  o r  the bond-f inanced  a g e n c y ) ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  forms  
a re  l i k e l y  t o  be u n s t a b l e  i n  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s  t o  s h i f t s  i n  Congres s  
and i n  t h e  E x e c u t i v e .  
Pe rhaps  t h e  ma jo r  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  v a r i o u s  
p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  a p p r o a c h e s  a r e  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  T h i r d  World 
c o u n t r i e s  t o  b e  a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  ( b e s i d e s  b e i n g  c u s t o m e r s )  
and t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  s u c h  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t o  p r o t e c t  U.S .  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
a d v a n t a g e s  3 s  e f f e c t i v e l y  as g o v e r n m e n t a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  m i g h t .  
A g r e a t  d e a l  more s t u d y  i s  needed  on c o m p a r i s o n s  o f  t h e s e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s i n c e  some c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  models  may 
a c t u a l l y  t e  a s e d ,  i n  s e r i e s  a n d / o r  ir, p a r a l l e l .  Anotner  3 a e s t i o n  
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TABLE XI. 
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION 
OF ALTERNATIVE SPS 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 
+ P o s i t i v e  
0 Neutral  o r  weak - Negative 
? Uncertain 
E-0. Ability to  raise the 
requisite capital. 
E-1. Appropriate distributim 
of risks and benefits. 
E-2. Possibility of wide 
participation 
E-3. Continuity, stability, 
a d  flexibility 
E-4. Possibility of foreign 
sales and participatim 
E-5. Maximm inpact m U.S. 
energy supply. 
E-6. Ability to  capitalize 
m spin-off tecinologies. 
P-1. PCk Of d”””t+m by 
big g o v e m t  
P-2. Protectim of U.S. tech- 
nological ahmtages 
P-3. @porhmity for lhird 
World participatim 
M-1. Mininun i h t i f i c a t i o n  
w i t h  the military 
M-2. Assurance against 
strategic destabilizatim 
S-1. Widespread participation 
in mamgemmt, enployrrent 
S-2. Flexibility w i t h  respect 
t o  divestiture, 1.iquidatim 
S-3. A b i l i t y  to  act Qcisively 
in framwork of space law 
T-1. Ability to  foster, ut i l ize ,  
disseminate innovatims 
T-2. Ability t o  stinulate 
continual upgrading of SFS 
FULL DURATION 
Pi N 6 u rn d 
+ 
3 
- 
0 
- 
? 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
0 
? 
0 
- 
? 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
0 
? 
0 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
- 
0 
- 
? 
+ 
+ 
0 
? 
0 
? 
0 
0 
? 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
? 
+ 
0 
+ 
? 
0 
? 
0 
? 
0 
0 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
ZOMMERCI A L I  ZATl  ON ONLY 
. i 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
? 
9 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 7 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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7 3 5  s e - s l t i v i t y  of' t h e  v a r i o u s  o r g a n i z a t i ~ r - ~ z l  f o r m  t o  
crlar-lgez i n  t n e  g e n e r a l  socioecor!omic c o n t e x t  i s  ':en:; i n p o r t a n t  
2: well. zzck  form s h o u l d  Le cor . s idered  i n  r e l a t l c n  t c  a numLer 
of  a l t e - n a t i v e  f u t u r e  s c e n a r i o s  bes ides  t h e  s u r > r l s e - f r e e  f u t u r e  
i s s u n e c  ;y t h e  R e f e r e n c e  Des ign  p r o J e c t i o n s  of  c o s t s  , e l e c t r i c a l  
aemand, sn3. t e c h n o l o g y  g r o x t h .  ZCTI? o f  t h e  a l te -nz t l -Lve  s c e r i a r i o s  
Lcnicn sr,oula b e  c o n s i d e r e d  v;.Luld i n c l u d e  : 
7- 
D e f i n i t i v e  C l a n s  by  t h e  S o v i e t  Ur:ion t o  
u n d e r t a k e  a l a r g e - s c a l e  SPS progFam,. 
A r a p i d  c l i n a t i c  change  toward s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
c o l d e r  and  l o n g e r  w i n t e r s  i n  t h e  : j c r t h e r n  
Hemisphe re ,  w i t h  m a j o r  food  and eriergy s h o r t a g e s  
r e q u i r i n g  m a s s i v e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  n e a s u r e s ,  p e r h a p s  
i n c l u d i n g  a program for d e l i b e r a t e  xea the r  and 
c l i m a t e  m o d i f i c a t i o n .  
E x t e n s i v e  p r i v a t e  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  a c t i v l t i e s  i n  
s p a c e  i n  t h e  a reas  of  ma te r i a l s  p r o c e s s i n g ,  
i n f o r m a t . i o n  s e r v i c e s  ( i n c l u d i n g  p e r s o n a l  communica- 
t i o n s  s y s t e m s ,  d i r e c t  t e l e v i s i o n  b r o a d c o s t  from 
o r b i t  , package  l o c a t o r  s e r v i c e s  , g e o l o g i c a l  
p r o s p e c t i n g ,  and commerc ia l  r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  s e r v i c e s , ,  
and s p a c e - t o u r i s n  w i t h  s e c o n d - g e n e r a t i o n  r e u s a b l p  
v e h i c l e s .  
E x t e n s i v e  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  s p a c e  b y  t h e  U n i t e l  
S c a t e s ,  by t h e  S o v i e t  Union,  and/or  b y  o t h e r  nat ior .5  
or g r o u p s  o f  n a t i o n s .  
and r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  for t h i s  s t u d y  d i d  n o t  
p e r m i t  3 s  t o  p u r s u e  s u c h  a n  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  o r g a n i z e t i o n a l  cand ida te :  
z g a i n s t  a l t e r n a t e  f u t u r e s ,  a i t h o u g h  t h i s  i s  a n  i r n r o r t a n t  c o n s i d e r -  
a t i o n  wnich s h o u l d  b e  f o l l o w e d  up i n  f u r t h e r  s t u d i e s .  
I VI KEY ISSUES AiiD OBSERVAT 1011s 
DLiying t n e  S i x t e e n t h  Cer . :ury,  when t h e  ::ew !jcrlC! and  t h e  
r a r  East  ?;?re f i i . s t  b e i n g  e x r i o i t e d  b y  t h e  ma,ior z ~ r n p e a n  powers ,  
S p a i n ,  E r g l a n d ,  and t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  i n v e s t e d  up t o  a b o u t  1% o f  
t h e i r  r ? s p e c t i v e  G l J P ' s  i n  c o l o n i z a t i o n  p r o j e c t s .  England  a n a  
t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s ,  wh ich  h a d  f a r  l e s s  c e n t r a l i z a t i o r  of power t h a n  
d i d  S p e i n ,  t h i s  ..:as o n l y  possible b e c a u s e  o f  a r.?r; s o c i a l  i n v e n t l c . .  
for f i r a n c i n &  lci-*ge and e x ? e n s i v ?  u n d e r 2 a h i n g s .  71rlzt new s o c i a l  
i n v e n t i o n  :cas t h ?  j o i n t  s t o c k  ccmpany. 
- - 
L.2 we c : ? : , ~  'I. t h t  th?*e.=?.!lrlz sf r-xtendlrlg c u r  e",,r~crric 
c .hater. ? "  ir.tc ~ r . - . ~ . ? l c . ~  new world, xe :C !G  ~ k : j  !-iced a rleo c o z l a i  
Invention fcr xiking possible large-scale projects approaching 
1% of our G!:i rJver an extended period. (The Apollo Program at 
its peak invQl-red %$ of GNP for two or three years. ) Three 
of the organizational forms mentirJned above are completely new 
social inven:icns: the taxpayer-stock corporation, the staging 
company, and. t?.e universal capitalism model. The concept of 
using long-tera bonds to finance B long-term R&D project which 
is reasonably likely to provide large profits is a new twist 
on an old iaea. These four organizational ideas, in particular, 
deserve a good deal more study to examine their ramifications 
throughout society. 
The entire question of whether private industry or govern- 
ment should carry out an SPS proEram (or, indeed, any large- 
scale program) inevitably has a strong ideological component. 
To the extent possible, the advantages and disadvantages of each 
position need to be spelled out in great detail by advocates 
of each position. (15) The ulthate decision probably must be 
made in the marketplace and in the polling booths. The formation 
of International Satellite Industries, Inc., may prove to be 
catalytic in the entire field of space utilization during the 
next few decades. IS1 presently hopes to make its first public 
offering of cormor, stock about the beginning of 1979. To the 
extent necessary and possible, legal and administrative steps 
should be teken to clear the way for IS1 to give this experiment 
a reasonable chance to prove itself. 
Federal participation in the R & D  phase would probably 
be most successful if it were at least partly funded by long- 
term "Space Bonds." The sale of U.S. bonds to help win the 
war was highly successful because it gave people a sense of 
participation in a clearly defined, large-scale goal consissent 
with the personal values of most of the population. Human expan- 
sion into space seems to be highly consistent with traditional 
American values; personal participation during the R&D phase is 
likely to be s~ccessful, provided the effective interest were 
competitive. ExeKpting interest on Space Bonds from federal 
taxes would help stimulate widespread participation, especially 
if they could be traded commercially in modest lots. The eventual 
redemption of the bonds could be based on a licensing fee f o r  
each power satellite manufactured by a U . S .  corporation or sold 
to a utility company in the U.S. 
Intermtionslly, it seems that the INTELSAT model may be 
the most viable system, with each participating country free to 
specify what type of domestic orgsnization may represent its 
interests. Representation in such an international organization 
need not, perhaps, be limited to a single entity per country, 
particularly if voting rights are based on share of the capital- 
ization of :he international body. 
Recognitian of the divisibility of the SPS program into 
an R63 phas? ET;d K commercial isrlementation phase is. key to 
discussions of f:;nding and manag.err.?nt schemes. 
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V, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
NEAR TERM STUDIES 
1. Tne e x i s t i n g  B a s e l i n e  and  R e f e r e n c e  D e s i g n s  f o r  SPS are  
based  Gn r e l a t i v e l y  s imple  e n g i n e e r i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  c h o i c e s  on 
t h e  bas i s  o f  which a f a i r l y  d e t a i l e d  d e s i g n  h a s  been  dt.'Jelo;,ed 
and c o s t e d .  Commercial v i a b i l i t y  of SPS,  however ,  w i l l  r e q u i r e  
a d i f f e r e n t  d e s i g n  p h i l o s o p h y :  d e s i g n  t o  c o s t ,  To d e t e r m i n e  a 
v i a b l e  commercial  c o s t ,  a b e n e f i t / c o s t  a n a l y s i s  s h o u l d  be done 
t o  d e t e r m i n e  $he  n e c e s s a r y  margin  be tween a low-cos t  SPS and 
f o s s i l  f u e l  o r  n u c l e a r  g e n e r a t i n g  p l a n t s  a f t e r  1990 which would 
j u s t i f y  t h e  e x p e n d i t u r e  o f  t e n s  o f  b i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  f o r  t h e  
R & D  p h i s e .  V z r i a b l e s  which should  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  i n c l u d e  f u t u r e  
p r i c e  t r e n d s  f o r  p e t r o l e u m ,  c o a l ,  n a t u r a l  gas,  and f i s s i o n a b l e  
mater ia l s ;  t h e  c o s t s  and s c h e d u l e  for t h e  SPS R & D  e f f o r t ;  and t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  c o s t s  o f  SPS. 
2 .  I n  v iew o f  t h e  l a r g e  number o f  d e s i g n  a l t e r n a t i v e s  for 
a S a t e l l i t e  Power Sys tem,  and t h e  l a r g e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  many o f  t h e  c o s t  components f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  
t h e  development  o f  a p a r a m e t r i z e d  c o s t  model f o r  a g e n e r a l  SPS 
model i s  now e s s e n t i a l .  Such a model would p r o v i d e  t h e  g u i d a n c e  
needed t o  o p t i m i z e  t h e  c o s t s  of  t h e  s y s t e m ,  s u g g e s t i n g  which 
components of  c o s t  o f f e r  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  d e c r e a s i n g  
t o t a l  sys t em c o s t .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  such  a model would b e  a v a l u a b l e  
t o o l  i n  a d e s i g n - t o - c o s t  approach .  
3 .  A d e t a i l e d  f i n a n c i a l  a n a l y s i s  s h o u l d  be made o f  e a c h  of  
t h e  p o s s i b l e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  forms d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  w i t h  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o s t s  o f  abandoning  t h e  p r o j e c t  b e f o r e  
comple t ion .  
4 .  A d e t a i l e d  s t u d y  o f  t h e  l e g a l  and  r e g u l a t o r y  a s p e c t s  o f  
e a c h  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  forms d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  s h o u l d  
b e  c a r r i e d  o u t ,  d e f i n i n g  l e g a l  o b s t a c l e s  and  p o t e n t i a l  s o l u t i o n s  
f o r  e a c h  o b s t a c l e  i d e n t i f i e d .  
5 .  The  v i a b i l i t y  o f  e a c h  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  fo rm and t h e  
s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  i t s  f i n a n c i n g  t o  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t o t a l  demand f o r  
SPS power,  t o t a l  i n v e s t m e n t  c a p i t a l  a v a i l a b l e ,  c o s t  p e r  k i l o w a t t  
f o r  SPS, and t i m e s c a l e s  f o r  t h e  R & D  and t h e  c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  
p h a s e s  o f  t h e  SPS program shou ld  b e  examined i n  t h e  c o n t e x t s  o f  
s e v e r a l  a l t e r n a t i v e  s c e n a r i o s  for t h e  f u t u r e .  Among t h e  s c e n a r i o s  
examined s h o u l d  b e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :  
( a )  T h j o r  S o v i e t  SPS program; 
( b )  Rapid and ma jo r  c l i m a t i c  change  i n  t h e  N o r t h e r n  
( c )  E x t e n s i v e  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  o t h e r  t y p e s  of 
( d )  E x t e n s i v e  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  s p a c e  b y  two or 
Hemisphere,  moving toward  a n  i c e  a g e ;  
s p a c e  i n d u s t r i e s ;  
mDre n a t i o n s .  
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6 .  Trie ~ . ~ i , r , ~ r n i c  a5iJantages of u s i n g  equato i . i . a l  laUrlckl 
s i t e s  VelYuS l a u n c h  s i t e s  wi th i r :  tkIo t e r r i t o r : , .  u f  t k i k  5 y . i t e c i  
S t a t e s  s h o u l d  be c e t e r n i n e d ,  b r J th  s j l e c i f i c a l l y  and a s  F h r t  o f  t h e  
p a r a m e t r i z e d  c o s t  model recomrriendea above .  Zhould t h e  b e n e f i t s  
o u t x e i g h  t h e  f u l l y  a m o r t i z e d  c o s t s  of c o n s t r u c t i n g  a new l a u n c h  
complex o r  t h e  c o s t s  of  u s i n g  a lauricri s i t e  p r o v i d e d  by  some 
i n d e p e n d e n t  g r o ~ p  such  a s  E a r t h p o r t  (161, t h e  r e l a t i v e  a d v a n t a z e s  
o f  a p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  a p p r o a c h  t o  commerc ia l  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  
v e r s u s  a g o v e r n n e n t a l  approach  nay b e  a l t e r e d  s i g n i f i c h n t l y .  T h e  
q u e s t i o n s  o f  T h i r d  World p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and o f  p r o t e e t i o r !  of  U.S. 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  ad i ran tages  must b e  c o n s i d e r e d  c a r e f u l l y  i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  of  a l a u n c h  s i t e  on f o r e i g ?  s s i l  o r  a f l o a t  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
waters.  N a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  d e p l o y i n g  systems w i t h  
advaaced  t e c h n o l o g y  a b r o a d  must  a l s o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .  
7 .  F o r  a s y s t e m  as complex as t h e  SPS program,  an  o r g a n i z a -  
t i o n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  a l e n g t h y  R & D  e f f o r t  a n d / o r  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  
program w i l l  r e q u i r e  f a r  more e f f e c t i v e  and c o m p l e t e  i n t e r n a l  
a c c e s s  t o  d e t a i l e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  s y s t e m .  
Some e f f o r t  s h o u l d  b e  g i v e n  t o  c o n c e p t u a l  d e s i g n s  f o r  compute r i za -  
t i o n  o f  management t o o l s  s u c h  2s PERT c h a r t s  and CPM c h a r t s  f o r  
t h e  e n t i r e  p r o j e c t ,  i n  a form a c c e s s i b l e  t o  w o r k e r s  t h r o u g h o u t  
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  S i m i l a r  s y s t e m s  f o r  e n g i n e e r i n g  d e s i g n  informa-  
t i o n  s h o u l d  a l s o  be  c o n s i d e r e d .  T h e s e  s y s t e m s  would f a c i l i t a t e  
i n n o v a t i v e  ideas  from unexpec ted  q u a r t e r s  which  c o u l d  t h e n  b e  
c h a n n e l e d  r a p i d l y  t o  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  s e c t i o n  of t h e  o v e r a l l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  
LONGER TERM STUDIES 
1. Throughout  most o f  t h e  T h i r d  World,  t h e  ma jo r  demand 
f o r  ene rgy  i s  f o r  cook ing  and s p a c e  h e a t i n g .  The wor ldwide  marke t  
f o r  SPS would t h u s  b e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  expanded i f  SPS e l e c t r i c i t y  
c o u l d  b e  used  as a p r imary  e n e r g y  s o u r c e  f o r  t h e  s y n t h e s i s  o f  
l i q u i d  f u e l s  ( s u c h  as m e t h a n o l )  and  f o r  t h e  s y n t h e s i s  of f e r t i l i z e r s  
( s u c h  as ammonia).  S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and o t h e r  
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  e l e c t r i c a l  demand i s  a small p o r t i o n  
of  t o t a l  e n e r g y  demand. The  m a r k e t  f o r  SPS would b e  expanded if 
SPS e l e c t r i c i t y  c o u l d  b e  used  f o r  t h e  e l e c t r o l y s i s  o f  water t o  
p r o v i d e  t h e  bas i s  of  a hydrogen  economy. Thus p r e l i m i n a r y  d e s i g n s  
and c o s t i n g  s h o u l d  b e  done  f o r  SPS i n t e r f a c e s  w i t h  a hydrogen  
economy and w i t h  t h e  s y n t h e s i s  o f  l i q u i d  f u e l s .  A s l i g h t  d e c r e a s e  
i n  SPS c o s t s  below t h e  R e f e r e n c e  D e s i g n  would make l i q u i d  f u e l  
s y n t h e s i s  f rom SPS power c h e a p e r  t h a n  p r e s e n t  e n e r g y  s o u r c e s  i n  
much o f  t h e  T h i r d  World. To m a k e  a n  SPS-based hydrogen  economy 
f e a s i b l e  i n  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  n a t i o n s ,  SPS c o s t s  would have  t o  b e  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r educed  f rom t h e  i e v e l s  o f  t h e  Ref 'erence 3 e s i g n .  
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- .  c ~ . ~ ~ >  CCC'CIEC. 5. f 'ar  r r ~ ~ r e  s i g n i f i c m t  c o n t r i t u t i o r l  t o  '; .;:. e l e c t r i c t i  
0 -  - = 2 , d d - t y  .. 2 <. 3 t h a n  t h e  255 assumed i n  t!ie Hef'trence Design ::jrstem. 
; . ,v.Jvd~ .c s u c h  s t u d i e s  t o  p r o v i d e  a d d i t i o n a l  d e s i g n  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  
F L r a z e t r i z e d  c o s t  model recommended above ,  w e  w i l l  have  l i t t l e  
reassnable basis f o r  s e l e c t i n g  t h e  optimum SPS c a n d i d a t e .  I n  
c s n s i d e r i n g  a n  SPS program e x t e n d i n g  f i f t y  years i n t o  t h e  f u t u r e ,  
the  u s e  o f  n o n t e r r e s t r i a l  m a t e r i a l s  i n  SPS c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  i n  
p h r t i c u l a r ,  c a n n o t  be i g n o r e d  r e s p o n s i b l y .  
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